King Taksin The Great
Chapter 10: King Taksin’s Royal Duties in the Military Sphere
King Taksin the Great undertook military affairs with a firm royal resolve, setting forth three principal objectives:
Suppressing the various factions within the country that had arisen following the fall of Ayutthaya to the Burmese. Many major provinces had declared themselves independent powers, and it was essential to subdue them in order to reunify the kingdom under a single sovereignty.
Defending the kingdom, anticipating inevitable warfare, as foreign enemies had not yet been fully vanquished. Vigilance and readiness were required to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty.
Expanding royal influence, by extending the realm and power of Siam throughout the Indochinese Peninsula, aiming to establish broader and more secure dominion.
These objectives reveal King Taksin’s vision not only to restore independence, but also to build a unified and powerful Siam.
10.1 Which factions did King Taksin suppress?
Map Showing the Locations of Influential Factions in the Early Thonburi Period
(From the book “สาระน่ารู้กรุงธนบุรี” or “Essential Knowledge of Thonburi”)
The suppression of the four factions to reunify the nation
In order to reunite the Kingdom of Siam into a unified realm, it was necessary for King Taksin to suppress various independent factions that had emerged following the fall of Ayutthaya. Although His Majesty was at a disadvantage—not having a native stronghold of his own (at that time his base was in Chanthaburi) and lacking noble rank or widespread recognition like other local warlords—he held a distinct advantage: he was in the prime of his life, full of energy, sharp in mind and spirit, and decisive in action.
10.1.1 What was King Taksin’s strategy in unifying the various factions?
At first, King Taksin of Thonburi intended to use force to attack the strongest factions first, believing that if he could defeat the most powerful groups, the weaker ones would be intimidated and willingly submit to his authority without further conflict. However, events did not unfold as he had anticipated.
Consequently, His Majesty adjusted his royal policy—reversing the approach to first consolidate the weaker factions under his control. This allowed him to strengthen his own forces, after which he turned his attention back to conquering the stronger factions, now with greater military power and support.
Steps in the Unification Campaign by King Taksin the Great
Step 1: The Campaign Against the Group of Chao Phraya Phitsanulok (Rueang), 1768 (B.E. 2311)
King Taksin of Thonburi led an army to subdue the powerful group under Chao Phraya Phitsanulok. Upon reaching Koei Chai (present-day Nakhon Sawan), his forces clashed with those of Phitsanulok. During the battle, King Taksin was wounded by a bullet to his left shin, forcing a royal order to retreat.
Afterward, Chao Phraya Phitsanulok declared himself king, but reigned only briefly — around 7 days — before succumbing to a throat abscess and passing away.
His younger brother, Phra Inthorakorn, took over the city but was soon overthrown by an army from Chao Phra Fang, who executed him in Phitsanulok.
(Source: Prasert Na Nakhon, 1991; “สาระน่ารู้กรุงธนบุรี”, 2000)
Step 2: The Campaign Against the Faction of Chao Phimai, 1768 (B.E. 2311)
With Thonburi established as the capital, King Taksin turned to suppress the Chao Phimai faction. He led his troops to attack Nakhon Ratchasima and won a decisive victory.
Upon hearing of this, Chao Phimai (Prince Thepphiphit) fled with his family and followers, intending to seek refuge in the Kingdom of Lan Xang (Laos).
However, Khun Chana, a city official of Nakhon Ratchasima, captured him and presented him to King Taksin. Chao Phimai was subsequently executed.
Khun Chana was rewarded for his loyalty and valor with the title Phraya Kamhaeng Songkhram, and was appointed as the new governor of Nakhon Ratchasima.
(Source: “สาระน่ารู้กรุงธนบุรี”, 2000)
Step 3: The Campaign Against the Nakhon Si Thammarat Faction, 1769 (B.E. 2312)
King Taksin of Thonburi launched a combined land and naval expedition to subdue the faction under the ruler of Nakhon Si Thammarat. Seeing that he could not withstand the royal forces, the ruler fled with his family and followers to Pattani, but was captured by the governor there and handed over to Chao Nara Suriyawong, the newly appointed ruler of Nakhon Si Thammarat.
King Taksin later summoned the deposed ruler to Thonburi to determine his punishment. However, upon arrival, the king granted him royal pardon, accepted his service as a government official, and granted him land to reside on. The former ruler also offered his daughter, Chim, to serve as one of the king’s consorts.
By the end of 1776 (B.E. 2319), Chao Nara Suriyawong passed away, and King Taksin reappointed Chao Nu (the former ruler) to govern Nakhon Si Thammarat once more, this time with the rank of a vassal king, styled Phra Chao Nakhon Si Thammarat.
Note: In 1785 (B.E. 2328), during the reign of King Rama I, Chao Nu was accused of multiple offenses by his son-in-law, Chao Phat, and was summoned to the capital for trial. Chao Nu lost the case and requested to remain in government service in Bangkok, where he passed away about a year later. Chao Phat was then appointed Chao Phraya Nakhon Si Thammarat in his place.
(Source: “สาระน่ารู้กรุงธนบุรี”, 2000: 138-139)
Step 4: The Campaign Against the Phra Fang Faction
After the fall of Ayutthaya to Burma, Maha Rueang, a monk, gathered followers and established authority in several cities. He declared himself ruler despite not having disrobed, changing only his robes to red. He became known as Chao Phra Fang and led a powerful faction in the north.
In 1768 (B.E. 2311), upon learning of the death of Chao Phraya Phitsanulok and the succession of Phra Inthorakorn, Chao Phra Fang marched to capture Phitsanulok. With support from locals who opposed the new ruler, he succeeded and ordered Phra Inthorakorn’s execution, confiscating wealth, weapons, and relocating the population to Fang.
By 1770 (B.E. 2313), Chao Phra Fang’s rule grew increasingly corrupt and immoral, as he drank alcohol, committed acts against monastic codes, and sent rogue monk-commanders to raid villages. Upon hearing of this, King Taksin ordered a campaign to subdue him. The battle lasted three days, after which Chao Phra Fang fled with his followers and a rare white elephant calf. Thonburi’s forces captured the elephant, but Chao Phra Fang disappeared without a trace.
(Source: “สาระน่ารู้กรุงธนบุรี”, 2000: 139-140)
Rajawongse Sumanachat Sawatdikun remarked on the great wisdom and capability of King Taksin the Great in subduing the various factions during the early Thonburi period in his work “King of Thonburi”, published in “Mahawitthayalai” Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, B.E. 2480 (1937):
“King Taksin’s brilliance in fully liberating Ayutthaya from foreign control is profoundly praiseworthy.
If one compares his position with that of other powerful contemporaries, it is evident that he had the least advantage in the quest to restore the kingdom.
Chao Phraya Phitsanulok had a stable base and a strong army.
Chao Phra Fang was highly favored by the people, who believed he possessed magical powers.
The ruler of Nakhon Si Thammarat had both manpower and martial prowess—capable of maintaining independence without any external help.
Chao Phimai held royal blood and was beloved by the people, who admired his merit and supernatural qualities.
Phraya Nai Kong (called Suki by the Burmese, a title meaning commander, later used as a name in Thai sources) and Chao Thong-In or Nai Boonsong, as recorded in the chronicles, also had Burmese military support.
King Taksin alone stood with the least resources. He had only 500 soldiers, a single firearm, and no permanent shelter—wandering across regions with hardship and struggle.
Even his decision to establish a base in Chanthaburi was not originally part of a grand strategy but rather a necessity forced by circumstance.
His situation stood in stark contrast to others. He relied solely on his own courage, intellect, youthful vigor, and exceptional leadership skills.”
Major General Luang Wichitwathakan also discussed King Taksin’s military campaigns to suppress the four major factions—Phitsanulok, Fang, Nakhon Si Thammarat, and Phimai—in his work “Siam and Suvarnabhumi” (cited in Thai Journal, Vol. 20, Issue 72, Oct–Dec B.E. 2542):
“He subdued each faction one by one, aided by two great heroes: King Rama I (Somdet Phra Phutthayotfa Chulalok) and Krom Phra Ratchawang Bowon (Chao Phraya Surasi).
Within only three years, all factions were defeated, and the Kingdom of Siam was once again united in B.E. 2313 (1770), restoring strength and unity to the realm.”
10.2 What royal duties did King Taksin perform to defend the kingdom?
To defend the kingdom, King Taksin’s royal duties included waging war against the Burmese and eliminating Burmese influence from the Lan Na region.
10.2.1 War with Burma
After reclaiming Ayutthaya, King Taksin’s foremost and most critical task was defending the kingdom from Burmese threats. Following his victory at the Battle of Pho Sam Ton camp in November 1767 (B.E. 2310), Thailand fought the Burmese nine more times during King Taksin’s reign. Details are as follows:
The First War: Battle of Bang Kung | Year Pig (1767, B.E. 2310)
After King Taksin recaptured Ayutthaya from the enemy (breaking the Pho Sam Ton camp and killing the Burmese leader Suki Phra Nay Kong in that battle), his fame spread widely. His glory as the savior of Thailand from Burma was renowned. King Taksin established his seat in Thonburi and held a coronation ceremony in the Year of the Pig, 2310 B.E. The major and minor towns gladly accepted him, with many people pledging allegiance, including foreign traders such as the Chinese, who recognized him as the Thai king.
Following his coronation and proclamation as the Great King of Ayutthaya according to ancient royal traditions, King Taksin rewarded his commanders and officials. Notably, Nai Sutjinda was appointed Minister of Police, and Luang Yokkrabat from Ratchaburi (the elder brother of King Rama I of the Chakri dynasty) was also invited to serve, becoming the royal official in charge of police duties.
When it comes to the governance of the provinces, the Royal Chronicles state that after King Taksin was crowned, he appointed officials to oversee all the small and large cities. However, according to the records, there were only a few cities at that time with enough population to be quickly reestablished as proper cities. Roughly, the provinces were:
Northern Cities: Ayutthaya (the old capital), Lopburi, Ang Thong
Eastern Cities: Chachoengsao, Chonburi, Rayong, Chanthaburi, Trat
Western Cities: Nakhon Chai Si, Samut Songkhram, Phetchaburi
This totals about 11 cities that still had enough people to be reestablished, and it was necessary to appoint governors as before.
King Taksin assigned troops to be stationed across these cities. Chronicles mention sending Chinese soldiers to set up a camp in Bang Kung, in the Samut Songkhram area bordering Ratchaburi. It is believed similar garrisons existed elsewhere, though not specifically recorded.
After King Taksin recaptured Ayutthaya, the ruler of Vientiane (referred to as “Krung Si Sanakanhut”), who sided with Burma at the time, reported to the King of Ava that Taksin had taken power and restored Ayutthaya as the capital. The King of Ava was worried about a war with China and doubted the situation in Siam would be significant since the country was devastated and the population low.
Thus, the Burmese sent a royal order to Mangyi Marhya, the governor of Tavoy, to lead forces into Siam to suppress any uprising. Tavoy’s troops advanced via Sai Yok during the dry season, late Year of the Pig (B.E. 2310).
At that time, Kanchanaburi and Ratchaburi, located on the Burmese invasion route, were deserted. Burmese warships were stationed at Sai Yok, and Burmese forts lined the riversides at Ratchaburi but had not been dismantled.
When the Tavoy forces arrived at Bang Kung and saw King Taksin’s Chinese troops camped there, they laid siege. King Taksin assigned Phraya Mahamontri to command the vanguard, while he himself led the main army to Samut Songkhram to attack the enemy.
Phraya Tavoy, seeing he was losing, retreated back to Tavoy. At the checkpoint at Chao Khwao (near Ratchaburi on the Pashee River), the Thai army captured all Burmese warships, weapons, and supplies.
The Second War: When the Burmese attacked Sawankhalok | Year of the Tiger, B.E. 2313
This war occurred when King Taksin expanded his kingdom northward into Burmese territory. He had regained all former Ayutthaya territories within his realm except for Tanintharyi (Tenasserim) and Mergui, which were still under Burmese control, along with Cambodia and Malaya, which remained vassal states.
King Taksin stayed to govern the northern cities throughout the rainy season, persuading scattered villagers to return to their original homes and surveying the population of the northern cities as follows: Phitsanulok had 15,000 people, Sawankhalok 7,000, Phichai (including Sawangkhaburi) 9,000, Sukhothai 5,000, and Kamphaeng Phet and Nakhon Sawan each had just over 3,000.
He appointed officials honored for their service in the war: Phra Yommarat (Krom Phra Ratchawang Bowon Mahasurasinghanat) was appointed as Chaophraya Surasi Phitsanuwathirat to govern Phitsanulok; Phra Phichai Racha was made Chaophraya governing Sawankhalok; Phra Siha Ratcha Det Chai became Phra Phichai; Phra Thainam was appointed Phra Sukhothai; Phra Surabodin of Chainat became Phra Kamphaeng Phet; and Phra Anurak Phuthon was made Phra Nakhon Sawan. He also appointed Phra Aphaironnarit (later King Rama I of Rattanakosin) as Phra Yommarat and commander of the Ministry of Interior, replacing the prime minister who was dismissed for being weak in war.
After organizing the northern cities, King Taksin returned to Thonburi.
At that time, Burma ruled Chiang Mai. The King of Ava had appointed Aphai Kamni, who had risen to the rank of Pomayungwan, as ruler of Chiang Mai since the old kingdom. When the Thonburi army attacked Sawangkhaburi, some of the Chaophraya Phang forces fled to seek refuge with the Burmese in Chiang Mai. Pomayungwan saw an opportunity to expand his territory downward because the Thai of Sawangkhaburi sided with King Taksin.
Therefore, he led his army to attack Sawankhalok in the 3rd month of the Year of the Tiger, B.E. 2313. At that time, Chaophraya Phichai Racha had just moved to Sawankhalok less than three months before, and his forces were still small. However, Sawankhalok had an ancient and strong fortress, so Chaophraya Phichai Racha defended the city and requested help from nearby cities.
The Burmese army attacking Sawankhalok was led by the Chiang Mai commander and mostly consisted of local soldiers under Burmese control. Seeing the defenders’ resolve, they besieged the city.
When Chaophraya Surasi, Phra Phichai, and Phra Sukhothai brought reinforcements and attacked the Burmese from both sides, the Burmese forces were defeated and fled. During this battle, the Thonburi army itself was not seriously troubled.
The Third War: The First Thai Attack on Chiang Mai | Year of the Rabbit, B.E. 2314
The reason King Taksin led an attack on Chiang Mai at this time was likely due to his strategic thinking. The Burmese forces in Chiang Mai were not very strong or numerous. The Ava kingdom was also engaged in war with China and could not send reinforcements. Since Chiang Mai had recently broken away from Sawankhalok, their forces were fearful and unsettled.
King Taksin saw an opportunity to follow up immediately with an attack on Chiang Mai. Even if the city could not be captured, the campaign would still weaken the Burmese forces and provide valuable knowledge of the terrain for future plans.
With both the royal army and regional forces prepared, the campaign was launched at the beginning of the Year of the Rabbit, B.E. 2314.
The image shows the ruins of forts and the inner city walls of Chiang Mai, which date back to the historical city layout. These remnants have been preserved to this day as part of cultural heritage conservation efforts.
(Source: Daily News Newspaper; www.chiangmaihandicrafts.com/…/wallandmoat.htm)
The royal army of King Taksin of Thonburi, in its campaign to capture Chiang Mai, first assembled its forces at Mueang Phichai, mustering a total of 15,000 men. Chao Phraya Surasi was appointed commander of the vanguard, while His Majesty personally led the main army. The march proceeded without hindrance until they reached Lamphun. Upon learning of the swift advance, Bo Mayung Nguan, the Burmese commander stationed at Chiang Mai, refrained from engaging in open-field combat. Instead, he ordered his forces to establish defensive encampments outside the city.
The vanguard under Chao Phraya Surasi successfully routed the Burmese field positions. Consequently, Bo Mayung Nguan withdrew his troops into the city, fortifying its ramparts. The Thonburi army laid siege and launched an assault by night, beginning at the third hour and continuing until dawn. Yet the walls held fast, and the attack failed. Recognizing the strength of Chiang Mai’s fortifications, King Taksin ordered a strategic withdrawal.
A popular saying held that no monarch could capture Chiang Mai on the first attempt—success came only on the second. Such belief may have influenced the king’s decision to fall back.
Seizing the opportunity, Bo Mayung Nguan launched a counteroffensive, sending his troops to harass the retreating Siamese. The Burmese vanguard engaged the Thai rearguard, causing disarray. Witnessing the threat firsthand, King Taksin descended to personally command the rearguard, drawing his sword and leading the charge. His soldiers rallied, engaging the Burmese in fierce hand-to-hand combat. Overwhelmed, the Burmese were driven back.
The king then returned to his royal barge at Phichai and sailed back down to the capital.
(For more details, see Section 10.2.2: The Eradication of Burmese Influence from Lan Na.)
The Fourth War: First Burmese Invasion of Phichai | Year of the Dragon, 2315 B.E.
The next two campaigns (Wars IV and V) were minor skirmishes, arising more from the pride of Burmese generals than from strategic intent. In 2314 B.E., a dispute broke out in the kingdom of Sri Sattanakhanahut between Prince Suriya Wong of Luang Prabang and Prince Bun San of Vientiane. Prince Suriya Wong launched an attack on Vientiane. Prince Bun San appealed to the King of Ava for aid.
The Burmese king dispatched Chikshingbo as the vanguard and Bo Suphla as commander of the main force to assist Vientiane. Learning of the invasion, Prince Suriya Wong retreated to defend Luang Prabang, the frontier city the Burmese would have to pass through.
Bo Suphla attacked Luang Prabang, and when the defenders failed to resist, the city capitulated. Bo Suphla was then ordered to remain in Chiang Mai to prepare for future Thai counteroffensives. He advanced through Nan Province, and nearing the Siamese border, may have wished to demonstrate his military prowess, particularly to Bo Mayung Nguan, who had once suffered defeat by the Thais at Sawankhalok.
Bo Suphla divided his forces and sent Chikshingbo to invade Siam. The Burmese took Lap Lae (modern-day Uttaradit) with ease, facing no resistance. Dissatisfied with their spoils, they marched further to attack Phichai during the dry season at the end of 2315 B.E.
At that time, Phichai’s garrison was small. Phraya Phichai fortified the city and refrained from open battle, sending for reinforcements from Phitsanulok. Chao Phraya Surasi quickly mobilized and marched to Phichai’s aid. Burmese forces had encamped at Wat Eka. Upon arrival, the Siamese troops launched a direct assault, while Phraya Phichai led a flanking maneuver, striking from another direction.
The clash escalated into hand-to-hand combat, and unable to hold their position, the Burmese were routed, fleeing northward to Chiang Mai.
This particular war is not recorded in Burmese chronicles, but according to the Royal Siamese Annals, Bo Suphla personally led the campaign. However, Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, having examined the ease of the Burmese defeat, concluded that it could not have been a major invasion. He reasoned that Bo Suphla must have only sent a subordinate commander, and upon learning of the defeat, would later lead a larger force himself—a matter discussed in the following section.
The Fifth War: Second Burmese Invasion of Phichai | Year of the Snake, 2316 B.E.
In early 2316 B.E., internal conflict erupted once again in Vientiane. One faction sought assistance from Bo Suphla, who led a force to suppress the unrest and remained in Vientiane through the rainy season. Growing suspicious of Prince Bun San, Bo Suphla forced him to send his children and top ministers to Ava as hostages.
At the end of the rainy season, Bo Suphla returned from Vientiane and proceeded to launch another attack on Phichai.
This assault may have stemmed from two primary motivations:
Reason 1, Bo Suphla may have received reports from Ava that King Mangra was planning a major campaign against Thonburi. Bo Suphla, wishing to test the mettle of the Thai forces, believed his own army, hardened by campaigns such as the capture of Luang Prabang, would prevail easily against the defenders of Phichai.
Reason 2 might also be that Pausupla felt deeply humiliated by the previous defeat of his troops, who had fled from Phichai in the Year of the Dragon (2315 BE), and thus resolved to return and redeem his honor in battle personally.
According to the Royal Chronicles, once the rainy season of 2316 BE ended, Pausupla once again led an army intending to attack Phichai. But this time, the Siamese were forewarned. Chaophraya Surasi and Phraya Phichai led forces to ambush the Burmese army at a strategic location along the route. When the Burmese arrived, the Siamese launched a sudden assault and routed Pausupla’s forces on Tuesday, the 7th waning day of the second lunar month, Year of the Snake, 2316 BE.
In this battle, during hand-to-hand combat, Phraya Phichai wielded twin swords, driving into enemy ranks until one of his swords broke. His bravery and skill earned lasting fame, and from that time onward, he became known as “Phraya Phichai of the Broken Sword.”
The Sixth war: The Second Siamese Expedition Against Chiang Mai | Year of the Horse, 2317 BE
King Taksin of Thonburi, while contemplating future military action, received reports of a major Mon rebellion against Burma. The rebellion was rapidly spreading, and it was judged that the Burmese would be preoccupied with subduing the Mon for a considerable time, and thus would be unable to turn their focus toward attacking Siam. This presented a strategic opportunity to strike Chiang Mai and weaken Burmese power in the region.
The King led the army north via Kamphaeng Phet and held a war council at Ban Rahaeng (now the site of modern-day Tak Province). News arrived that the King of Ava had appointed Alaungpaya Hsinbyushin (Asa Hkwan Kyi) as commander-in-chief to suppress the Mon uprising near Rangoon. The Mon forces were defeated and began to flee southward.
King Taksin then ordered Chao Phraya Chakri (later King Rama I) to lead the main northern army alongside Chao Phraya Surasi in a renewed assault on Chiang Mai, while the royal army remained stationed in Tak, awaiting further reports from Martaban.
The forces under Chao Phraya Chakri and Chao Phraya Surasi advanced through Lampang, and when Chao Phraya Chakri secured the city, King Taksin remained encamped at Ban Rahaeng. At that time, Mon refugees fleeing the Burmese began entering Siam through the Tak frontier, and Khun Inthakhiri, commander of the border post, escorted a Mon cook named Sming Suharai Klan to the King.
Upon interrogation, it was learned that the Mon had been defeated at Rangoon and that Alaungpaya was in pursuit. The Mon were now fleeing with their families en masse into Siamese territory.
Upon hearing that Phraya Kawila had led the people of Chiang Mai and Lampang to ally themselves with Siam, the King recognized this as a critical opportunity. He thus dispatched orders from Thonburi to Phraya Yommarat Khaek (son of Chao Phraya Chakri Khaek, who had previously passed away—Phraya Yommarat Khaek had earlier held the position of Phraya Ratchawangsan) to lead a force and set up a blockade at Tha Din Daeng, in preparation to receive incoming Mon refugees who would pass through the Three Pagodas Pass. Additionally, orders were given for Phraya Kamhaeng to support the effort.
Wichit commanded a force stationed at Ban Rahaeng, tasked with receiving Mon civilians who were fleeing into Siam through the Tak Pass. Later, the main royal army departed Ban Rahaeng on the 5th waning day of the first lunar month, Year of the Horse, B.E. 2317, and followed the route of Chao Phraya Chakri’s army toward Chiang Mai.
As for the army of Chao Phraya Chakri, having advanced from Nakhon Lampang, it reached Lamphun, where it encountered a Burmese force that had established a blocking encampment along the old Ping River, north of Lamphun. The Siamese launched an assault on the Burmese camp, resulting in several days of fierce fighting. When the main royal army arrived at Lamphun, Chao Phraya Chakri, Chao Phraya Surasi, and Chao Phraya Sawankhalok led a combined assault that broke the Burmese lines, forcing them to retreat to Chiang Mai. The royal army was then stationed in Lamphun, while Chao Phraya Chakri’s forces pursued the enemy and laid siege to Chiang Mai.
Within the city, Bo Suphla and Bo Mayung Nguan, the Burmese commanders, who had been tasked with the city’s defense, upon seeing the Siamese establishing encampments around the city, led their troops to set up counter-camps in proximity to the siege lines and launched several raids against the Thai positions. However, each time they were repelled by accurate Siamese gunfire, resulting in heavy Burmese casualties and forced withdrawals back to their camps.
At the same time, many inhabitants of Chiang Mai, who had taken refuge in the surrounding forests, began to emerge and join the Siamese army. Even residents within the city walls found means to flee and surrender to the Siamese in large numbers.
The Chang Phueak Gate was reconstructed between B.E. 2509–2512 (A.D. 1966–1969), while the Tha Phae Gate was rebuilt later, during B.E. 2528–2529 (A.D. 1985–1986). These restoration projects were undertaken by the Chiang Mai Municipality in collaboration with the Fine Arts Department, relying on historical and archaeological evidence, along with photographic documentation as primary references.
(Source: Seen: Architectural Forms of Northern Siam and Old Siamese Fortifications)
On Saturday, the 3rd waxing day of the second lunar month, King Taksin of Thonburi led the royal army from Lamphun and took up position at the main encampment along the riverbank, near Chiang Mai. He proceeded to inspect the siege works that encircled the city, desiring to hasten the assault so that Chiang Mai might be taken swiftly. That very day, Chao Phraya Chakri launched an attack on the Burmese encampments which had been deployed beyond the southern and western walls—he succeeded in breaking all of them. Meanwhile, Chao Phraya Surasi stormed the eastern front, targeting the Burmese camps near the Tha Phae Gate, capturing three positions.
That night, Bo Suphla and Bo Mayung Nguan, the Burmese commanders, realizing the city could no longer be held, fled Chiang Mai through the Chang Phueak Gate to the north, directly in the front of Chao Phraya Sawankhalok’s position. As the siege ring was not yet fully sealed, they managed to break through. The Siamese forces gave chase, recovered a significant number of civilian captives, and inflicted severe casualties upon the Burmese.
At dawn the next day—Sunday, the 4th waxing day of the second lunar month—King Taksin made a ceremonial entry into Chiang Mai with his royal procession. With the successful capture of the city, just two days later, word arrived from Tak that another Burmese army had crossed into Siamese territory in pursuit of Mon refugees.
King Taksin, therefore, delegated Chao Phraya Chakri to remain in Chiang Mai to restore order and governance, while the king himself, after staying seven days, led the royal army back to Tak.
Chao Phraya Chakri, now in command of Chiang Mai, dispatched officials and nobles throughout the region to persuade the local populace to return to their ancestral settlements. The people of Lan Na, being ethnically Thai and having lived under Burmese rule against their will, welcomed the restoration of Siamese sovereignty and submitted peacefully without the need for further conflict. On this occasion, Chao Phraya Chakri also won over the Prince of Nan, who pledged allegiance and became a tributary vassal once again.
Thus, Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Nakhon Lampang, Nan, and Phrae were successfully restored to the Kingdom of Siam during this campaign. (See details at 10.2.2)
The Seventh War: The Burmese Campaign at Bang Kaeo, Ratchaburi (Siamese Siege and Burmese Starvation) | Year of the Horse, 1177 B.E. (A.D. 1774)
Upon His Majesty King Taksin’s return to the capital from the victorious campaign in Chiang Mai, urgent news reached the court that a Burmese army had breached Siamese territory via the Three Pagodas Pass, attacking the army of Phraya Yommarat Khaek, which had been stationed at Tha Dindaeng. Defeated, the Siamese forces withdrew and regrouped at Pak Phraek, present-day Kanchanaburi.
At that time, the royal army that had followed His Majesty on the northern campaign was still en route by river and had yet to return in full. His Majesty immediately ordered a domestic levy of troops from the capital. Prince Chui, his son, and Phraya Thibetsabodi, the Chief Palace Steward, were each given command of 3,000 men and dispatched to fortify Ratchaburi. Chao Ram Lak, the king’s nephew, was sent to reinforce the campaign with an additional 1,000 troops. Orders were also given for the northern provincial armies to advance south, and a royal command was issued to hasten the return of the main army from the northern front.
According to Burmese chronicles, Azaewungyi (อะแซหวุ่นกี้) dispatched Ngui Okhong Wun (also known as Chap Phaya Kongbo or Chap Kungbo) to lead the current invasion. His mission was solely to retrieve Mon refugees who had fled into Siam. If successful in capturing them, he was to escort them back; if not, he was to withdraw peacefully. However, Ngui Okhong Wun, confident from previous victories over the Siamese, grew emboldened. After defeating Phraya Yommarat Khaek at Tha Dindaeng, he advanced to Pak Phraek. Facing no resistance, Phraya Yommarat Khaek abandoned the camp and fell back to Dong Rang Nong Khao.
Seeing no opposition, Ngui Okhong Wun divided his army into two columns. One, led by Mongchayik, was stationed at Pak Phraek to plunder the surrounding areas and capture civilians across Kanchanaburi, Suphanburi, and Nakhon Chai Si. The second column, under Ngui Okhong Wun himself, launched raids in Ratchaburi, Samut Songkhram, and Phetchaburi. Upon reaching Bang Kaeo, he learned of the Siamese presence at Ratchaburi and accordingly established three fortified camps there.
In Ratchaburi, Prince Chui, now apprised of the Burmese encampment at Bang Kaeo and believing the situation favorable, especially with reinforcements on the way, mobilized his army to Khok Kratai in the Thung Thammasen plains—about 80 sen (approx. 7.8 kilometers) from the Burmese position. There, he ordered:
Luang Maha Thep to lead the vanguard and encircle the Burmese from the west
Chao Ram Lak to establish a flanking position from the east
King Taksin of Thonburi ordered Phraya Phichai Aisawan to take charge of defending Nakhon Chai Si, while His Majesty personally led the royal army to Ratchaburi. Upon arrival, the King visited the encampment encircling the Burmese forces at Bang Kaeo, examined the terrain, and gave instructions for additional fortifications to be built, tightening the siege further.
Chao Phraya Intharaphai was tasked with guarding the reservoir at Khao Chua Phruean, a strategic source of water for the enemy’s elephants and horses, and a major supply route. Phraya Ramanwong was assigned to lead Mon troops to secure the reservoir at Khao Chaguem, situated along another northern supply line used by the Burmese, roughly 120 sen (11.7 km) from the encampment.
Nguiya Khong Hwon, the Burmese general under siege, observed the increasing pressure and launched a night raid against Chao Phraya Intharaphai’s encampment. The Burmese were repelled. That same night, they attempted three assaults, each of which ended in failure, with significant losses and numerous prisoners taken by the Siamese.
Realizing the might of the Siamese army, Nguiya Khong Hwon requested reinforcements from the Burmese base at Pak Phraek. Alaungpaya’s general, Azaewunkyi, who had been stationed at Martaban (Mottama), followed upon hearing of Nguiya Khong Hwon’s disappearance and arrived at Pak Phraek just as news of the siege reached him.
Meanwhile, Chao Phraya Chakri returned from the campaign in Chiang Mai and marched his forces south to join the battle. The siege wore on. The Burmese, now surrounded and starving, endured relentless bombardment by Siamese cannons. Burmese casualties mounted, and eventually their generals were forced to surrender and submit to King Taksin. By that time, Azaewunkyi had already retreated to Martaban.
Following the capture of the Burmese encampment at Bang Kaeo, King Taksin ordered Chao Phraya Chakri to march immediately to attack the Burmese position at Khao Chaguem. That very night, at midnight, the Burmese staged a “khaai wihan” maneuver—an infiltration tactic where soldiers silently advance inch by inch toward the enemy’s defenses before launching a surprise assault from close range on all fronts.
The Burmese aimed to break through and support their besieged allies at Bang Kaeo. In this raid, they set fire to Phra Mahasongkhram’s camp. Chao Phraya Chakri arrived in time to reinforce and successfully retake the encampment. The Burmese were forced to retreat.
That same night, the Burmese garrison at Khao Chaguem abandoned their position and fled northward. The Siamese pursued them, inflicting heavy casualties. The Burmese commanders who managed to escape made their way to Pak Phraek, where Takheng Morn Nong, upon learning that all Burmese forces had been defeated, chose not to resist and swiftly retreated to rejoin Azaewunkyi at Martaban.
King Taksin commanded his army to pursue the fleeing Burmese to the farthest reaches of the kingdom’s borders before ordering a return to the capital. In recognition of their valor and success, rewards and honors were bestowed upon the commanders, both senior and junior, who had distinguished themselves in the campaign.
The Battle of Bang Kaeo stands as a significant example of strategic defense outside the royal capital during the Thonburi era, embodying both offensive and defensive strategies. While its importance might seem modest at first glance, based on the interpretation of Somdet Krom Phraya Damrong Rajanubhab in Thai Combat Against Burma, this battle was essentially a prolonged engagement arising from the pursuit of Mon refugees who fled into Siamese territory under the command of Nguiya Khong Hwon.
Notably, the Burmese side—especially the supreme commander Alaungpaya (Azaewunkyi)—had no explicit intention to engage in sustained warfare with Siam, as they had yet to receive orders from King Mangra to invade Siam.
However, it is striking that evidence from both Thai and Burmese sources consistently confirms that the Burmese held a resolute determination to confront Siam directly. The clash was not merely a collateral result of pursuing Mon refugees, but represented a deliberate military confrontation.
A schematic map of the siege of the Burmese at Bang Kaeo, B.E. 2317 (1774)
(Image from the book King Taksin the Great)
The Royal Chronicle in the form of the Royal Letter describes this military campaign, stating that King Mangra ordered his officials to hasten the army of Azaewunkyi, then stationed at Mottama, to “pursue the Mon rebels and capture the Siamese cities.” Azaewunkyi thus organized both the vanguard and the supporting army, with the vanguard attacking the Siamese forces stationed at Tha Din Daeng.
Burmese sources, such as the accounts of the Ava people, note: “In the year 1136 of the Burmese era, Azaewunkyi led the army to attack Ayutthaya. The vanguard reached Ratchaburi, where the Siamese army laid siege.” Meanwhile, the Ho Kaeo Chronicle and the Konbaung Dynasty Chronicle clearly state that King Mangra commanded Azaewunkyi to invade Siam with decisive victory.
Therefore, the Battle of Bang Kaeo should be regarded as a major battle—not merely an encounter aimed at capturing Burmese troops pursuing Mon refugees and looting at will.
Thai and Burmese evidence consistently agree that the main objective of the Burmese commanders in the Battle of Bang Kaeo was to seize Ratchaburi. Consequently, Ratchaburi was a crucial strategic location in this war. However, this does not imply that Ratchaburi’s military strategic importance emerged only at this battle. Its significance dates back to the time of the Alawngpaya campaign (B.E. 2303), which followed the altered invasion route through Tavoy, compelling the Burmese army to advance through Phetchaburi, Ratchaburi, and Suphanburi.
This change made Ratchaburi an inevitable strategic gateway city.
More importantly, Thai and Burmese military strategists regarded Ratchaburi as the “final fortress” that an invading army would have to overcome to penetrate the heart of Siamese power. Historical records show that Ratchaburi had served as a strategic defensive city since the Alawngpaya campaign. During the 1767 fall of Ayutthaya, the main Thai forces intercepted the Burmese invasion under Mang Ma Noratha at Ratchaburi.
When the Burmese captured Ratchaburi, they used it as a base to divide their forces to attack Ayutthaya by two routes: one to block western cities such as Kanchanaburi and Suphanburi, and the other to block southern cities near Ayutthaya, including Thonburi and Nonthaburi.
Ratchaburi’s military strategic importance increased further during the Thonburi period, despite the Burmese shifting their invasion route to the Phra Chedi Sam Ong checkpoint.
The rise in strategic value resulted from internal changes within Siam. R.S. Sarisak Vallibhotama observed that with the capital moving south from Ayutthaya to Thonburi and later Bangkok, the invasion routes had to shift. To attack Bangkok or Thonburi, invading forces no longer needed to move through Kanchanaburi, Phanom Thuan, Suphanburi, and Ang Thong, but could instead move through Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi, Nakhon Pathom, and Thonburi directly.
The new routes allowed movement by both land and water, especially along the Khlong Noi river to Pak Praek and then down the Mae Klong river to Ratchaburi.
Thus, the defense strategy during the Thonburi era evolved from the late Ayutthaya period. Victory or defeat no longer hinged on battles at the capital but on controlling key strategic towns.
In the Battle of Bang Kaeo, the decisive factor for victory or defeat was control over Ratchaburi by the commanding generals of both sides. It was therefore unsurprising that King Taksin acted swiftly and decisively to seize Ratchaburi as his military base.
The chronicles state that upon learning of the Burmese army’s approach via the Phra Chedi Sam Ong checkpoint, King Taksin commanded “Prince Chui and Phraya Thibethbodi, each leading 3,000 troops, to establish camps to defend Ratchaburi,” and also ordered Chao Ram Lak, his nephew, to lead 1,000 troops as reinforcement.
One division of the army, while the main force was following the King to attack Chiang Mai and in the process of sailing back to Thonburi, was ordered to have police boats board and escort them down. The King commanded, “Do not let anyone stop at any house under any circumstances. Anyone who does will be put to death.” When the royal boat carrying Phraya Phra Luang Khun Muen and all officials hastened to the palace dock, after respectfully paying their respects and bidding farewell, they were waved onward to hasten to Ratchaburi.
It is evident that this military campaign was urgent and time-critical. Anyone who disobeyed the royal command and caused delay would face severe punishment. Records show that when Phra Thep Yot stopped his boat to step ashore, upon learning this the King himself decreed capital punishment by beheading with his own hand. The head was then ordered to be displayed publicly at the front of Wichai Prasit Fortress as a warning, and the body was discarded in the water to prevent any imitation.
The army deployed for this campaign included a Mon contingent under Phraya Ramanyawong, as well as the forces of Chaophraya Chakri and the northern and eastern provincial armies, who joined subsequently. King Taksin himself led the main force of 8,800 men directly to the fortified camp at Ratchaburi.
Opposing them, Azaewunkyi, a highly skilled Burmese general, understood the strategic necessity of seizing Ratchaburi as a stronghold before the main Thai forces could take it. The defeat of Azaewunkyi’s army at Bang Kaeo was partly due to his failure to capture Ratchaburi. The vanguard he sent was pinned down by the Thai forces, preventing the main army gathered at Mottama from reinforcing them effectively.
Although the route through the Phra Chedi Sam Ong checkpoint chosen by Azaewunkyi for the Bang Kaeo campaign was a shortcut to quickly attack Thonburi, it was a rugged and difficult path. Moreover, any delay risking the enemy’s occupation of key terrain to block the route and cut off supplies would create serious difficulties for the Burmese army, especially the main army with its large forces requiring wide terrain for camp and maneuver.
Evidence from the Burmese side reveals the efforts of Azaewunkyi to swiftly launch an attack on the Thai forces. However, internal divisions arose within the army, causing delays. In brief, initially Azaewunkyi ordered the great commander Minye Zeya Kyaw, who led 3,000 royal guards, to strike and break through the Thai forces blocking the Burmese advance. Yet Minye Zeya Kyaw refused to carry out the order, claiming insufficient troops. Azaewunkyi reported this to King Mangra. Upon learning the situation, Minye Zeya Kyaw withdrew his forces to Mottama.
Consequently, Azaewunkyi had to dispatch Chap Phaya Kongbo (also called Nguy Okong Hun in Thai Fight Burma) to act instead, but this was too late. By the time the Burmese vanguard reached Pak Praek and Ban Bang Kaeo, the Thai army had already established a stronghold at Ratchaburi.
Azaewunkyi’s failure in the Battle of Bang Kaeo forced him to change his military strategy, shifting the campaign northward to attack Phitsanulok, as King Bayinnaung and Nemyo Sithu had done before. Strategically, the Battle of Bang Kaeo is thus a continuation of Azaewunkyi’s campaign. It was not only the largest and most important battle in King Taksin’s reign but also a battle that challenged and ultimately overcame the Thai defensive strategy—one adapted from hard-earned lessons since the 1767 fall of Ayutthaya.
The Thonburi to early Rattanakosin era was marked by strategic provincial towns becoming decisive battlefields. Ratchaburi was one such key town. The Battle of Bang Kaeo was essentially a battle for the strategic city of Ratchaburi, just as the Battle of Azaewunkyi was fought over Phitsanulok.
Victory or defeat here meant more than the loss of a strategic town—it could ultimately lead to losing the entire war and even the capital itself.
(Sunet Chutintharanon, 2000: 173–178)
Sri Chonlai (pen name) in 1939, in Thai Must Remember, wrote to glorify King Taksin the Great, stating
King Taksin the Great was not only the foremost of Thai warriors, but He also strove to show the world that Thailand was a nation of warriors upheld by the highest moral virtue. This was evident when the Burmese army invaded through Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi, and Nakhon Chai Si in the Year of the Horse 2317 BE (the 7th year of the Thonburi era). At that time, King Taksin had just returned from subjugating Chiang Mai, and His Majesty’s mother was seriously ill. Yet, King Taksin resolutely set forth promptly to confront the Burmese at Ratchaburi, unwilling to allow the enemy to trample the outskirts of the capital, thereby dishonoring the Thai nation, nor did He wish the morale of the Thai people to falter.
After only nine days, Khun Wiset Oso hastened to report the grave condition of the Queen Mother. Upon hearing this, King Taksin uttered with deep sorrow that, “Her illness is so severe, I shall not live to see Her again. This land is in great peril. Now, there is no one trustworthy enough to stay and resist the enemy.” In the end, His Majesty broke His heart and did not return home, for His concern was for the realm. He persevered in battling the Burmese forces. Meanwhile, the Queen Mother passed away.
King Taksin continued the siege against the Burmese army, encircling them with no route for escape. Although His soldiers could have launched a mass volley to annihilate the enemy camp, He forbade it, preserving the honor of Thai warriors. When the enemy was utterly defeated and without means of resistance, Thai warriors refrained from unnecessary harm.
Eventually, the Burmese forces were exhausted and submitted to His Majesty’s sovereignty on March 31 of that year. Therefore, March 31 should be held as a solemn remembrance for Thai soldiers, who embodied the highest moral virtues, marking a proud legacy:
Thai soldiers hold the nation above all else, willing to sacrifice personal ties—even amid profound sorrow—so long as the nation’s cause is fulfilled.
Thailand does not invade others; yet if any nation dares trespass, Thai warriors will leave no enemy unvanquished.
Even when foes are trapped and defenseless, Thai warriors choose not to harm those who cannot resist, thus preserving honor.
Once the enemy yields, Thailand shows compassion and care appropriate to the circumstances, refraining from further vengeance.
Every inch of Thai soil stands free and independent because Thai warriors remain strong and resolute.
(Praphat Treenarong, Thai Journal 20(72), October–December 1999: 18–19)
The Eighth War: The Campaign of Aza Wungyi against the Northern Cities | Year of the Goat, 2318 BE
This war was a grander battle than any other during the Thonburi period. In this campaign, Aza Wungyi declared to his commanders that the Thai people were no longer as they had been in times past, meaning that from now on the Burmese would no longer be able to defeat the Thais.
The cause of this war arose when King Taksin the Great restored the independence of Siam, at a time when Burma was engaged in war with China. Upon completion of the Chinese campaign in the Year of the Rabbit, 2314 BE, the King of Ava conceived plans to invade Siam again. He intended to appoint Posupala as the general to lead the forces down from Chiang Mai, and Pakhan Wun as the general to advance through the Three Pagodas Pass, to besiege and attack Thonburi as had been done in the campaign against Ayutthaya.
However, both invasion routes were obstructed. From the north, the Siamese forces had already marched to capture Chiang Mai first; from the south near Martaban, while preparations were underway for the army’s advance, the Mon people rebelled fiercely, causing great turmoil. Therefore, the plan to invade Siam did not succeed as intended by the King of Ava.
Shwedagon Pagoda, Rangoon City
(Image from www.trekkingthai.com/cgi-bin/webboard/generat…)
In the Year of the Horse, 2317 BE, the King of Ava proceeded to raise the royal umbrella atop the sacred hair relic stupa, Shwedagon Pagoda, in the city of Rangoon. At that time, Aza Wungyi had already quelled the Mon rebellion, but was still awaiting the arrival of the Burmese army pursuing the Mon fugitives at Martaban. The King of Ava, seeing the large army stationed at Martaban, commanded that the plan to attack Chiang Mai be further devised by Aza Wungyi.
Aza Wungyi returned to Martaban in the fifth month of the Year of the Goat, 2318 BE. When the army of Taklang Mornong fled from the Thais back to Martaban, he reported the defeat of the Burmese forces by the Thais, who had captured the army of Nguy Ok Wun and crushed another Burmese force at Khao Changum. Thus, Taklang Mornong was forced to retreat once again.
อะแซหวุ่นกี้คิดแผนการตีไทยตามแบบอย่างครั้งพระเจ้าหงสาวดีบุเรงนอง คือจะยกกองทัพใหญ่เข้ามาตีหัวเมืองเหนือตัดกำลังไทยเสียชั้นหนึ่งก่อน แล้วเอาหัวเมืองเหนือเป็นที่มั่น ทั้งยกกองทัพบก ทัพเรือลงมาตีกรุงธนบุรีทางลำน้ำเจ้าพระยาทางเดียวดังนี้ จึงให้พักบำรุง
The troops were stationed at Mottama. Orders were sent to Poseuphla and Pomayuangwan, who had retreated from the Thai forces and were stationed at Chiang Saen, to return and capture Chiang Mai during the rainy season. They were also instructed to prepare warships, transport vessels, and gather provisions to supply the army of Acha Wunkyi, who would advance at the start of the dry season. Thus, Poseuphla and Pomayuangwan assembled their forces and marched down to attack Chiang Mai in the tenth lunar month of the year Ma-Me, 2318 BE.
Since the victory at Bang Kaeo, the Thonburi forces had a respite of five to ten months. Upon receiving news that Poseuphla and Pomayuangwan intended to attack Chiang Mai, King Taksin issued orders for Chaophraya Surasi to lead the northern city armies to aid Chiang Mai, and for Chaophraya Chakri to command the reinforcing army. The king commanded that if the Burmese were driven out of Chiang Mai, the armies were to pursue them and capture Chiang Saen.
Poseuphla and Pomayuangwan led the Burmese army to attack Chiang Mai ahead of the Thai forces, setting up camps close to the city to prepare the assault. However, their assembled forces were not very strong. When news came that the Thai army was approaching, the Burmese retreated back to Chiang Saen, avoiding battle.
Acha Wunkyi had prepared his army, and in the eleventh lunar month he sent Kalabo and Mang Yayangu, his younger brother, to lead the vanguard from Mottama. Acha Wunkyi himself followed with the main army. The Burmese troops entered through the Mae Lamao pass into Tak, then proceeded to Dan Lan Hoi, reaching Sukhothai. The vanguard camped at Kong Thani village by the New Yom River, while the main army rested at Sukhothai.
Meanwhile, Chaophraya Chakri and Chaophraya Surasi, stationed at Chiang Mai, were preparing to advance against Chiang Saen. Upon learning of the large Burmese army moving through Mae Lamao pass, they hastily withdrew their forces back toward the city.
At Sawankhalok and Mueang Phichai, upon arriving at Phitsanulok, the two Chaophrayas consulted on how to confront the enemy. Chaophraya Chakri observed that the Burmese had brought a large army, and the Thai forces in the north were far fewer. He advised to hold defense at Phitsanulok and await reinforcements from Thonburi. However, Chaophraya Surasi wished to strike the Burmese first, so he gathered the northern city armies and marched to engage the Burmese at Ban Kong Thani. Chaophraya Surasi advanced to camp at Ban Krai Pa Faek. The Burmese attacked and defeated the army of Phraya Sukhothai, who then retreated. They pursued and reached Chaophraya Surasi’s camp, fighting fiercely for three days. Seeing the Burmese greatly outnumbered them, he withdrew back to Phitsanulok.
Acha Wunkyi divided his Burmese forces to hold Sukhothai and personally led troops to besiege Phitsanulok, setting camps around the city on both sides of the river. Both Chaophrayas skillfully defended the city. While Acha Wunkyi was besieging Phitsanulok, the Thonburi army arrived, but Acha Wunkyi continued daily reconnaissance, inspecting strategic positions around the camp.
When Thonburi learned that Acha Wunkyi led a large army from the northern cities, at the same time a report came from the southern cities that Burmese forces were advancing from Tanintharyi in the south, King Taksin, wary of the threat, ordered a military levy to defend Phetchaburi and guard against Burmese forces expected to advance via Singkhon Pass. After organizing defenses in the southwest against the southern threat, King Taksin personally led the royal army of about 12,000 troops, departing the capital on Tuesday, the 11th waning day of the second lunar month of the year Ma-Mae, to confront the northern enemy forces.
First Phase of the Campaign
When King Taksin reached Nakhon Sawan, he first arranged communications to ensure easy coordination between the royal army and Chaophraya Chakri’s forces stationed at Phitsanulok. He ordered Phraya Racha Setthi to command the Chinese troops stationed at Nakhon Sawan to guard the supply routes and watch for enemies advancing down the Ping River. King Taksin then advanced the royal army along the Kwai Yai River to Pak Ping, within the jurisdiction of Phitsanulok, and set up the royal camp there. This location, at the canal junction, served as a shortcut for river travel between the Kwai Yai River at Phitsanulok and the Yom River at Sukhothai, located about a day’s travel downstream.
He commanded his commanders and generals to establish camps on both sides of the river at intervals from the royal army’s camp up to Phitsanulok city.
Phase 1: Camped at Bang Sai, commanded by Phraya Ratcha Suphawadi
Phase 2: Camped at Tha Rong, commanded by Chaophraya Intharaphai
Phase 3: Camped at Ban Kradad, commanded by Phraya Ratcha Phakdi
Phase 4: Camped at Wat Chulamani, commanded by Muen Samoechai Ratcha
Phase 5: Camped at Wat Chan Tai, Mueang Phitsanulok, commanded by Phraya Nakhon Sawan
Assign patrol units to guard all communication routes in every phase. Also prepare conscripted artillery troops as the vanguard, ready to assist any camp swiftly. Assign Phraya Sri Krailat to command 500 men to clear and maintain a route along the riverbank from Pak Ping through the camps up to Phitsanulok.
When the royal army advanced to link up with the forces guarding Phitsanulok, Acha Wunkyi promptly launched offensive attacks against the Thonburi army.
The chronicles record that after establishing camps along both banks of the river, Acha Wunkyi deployed three Burmese camps opposite Muen Samoechai Ratcha’s camp at Wat Chulamani on the western bank. Another Burmese force moved down to scout and confront Thai troops on the west side. Fighting occurred from the third camp down to the first camp at Bang Sai.
King Taksin dispatched 30 conscripted gunners with wagon-mounted artillery to assist Phraya Ratcha Suphawadi in defending the camps. The battles continued until nightfall, when the Burmese forces withdrew.
On Thursday, the 12th day of the waxing moon, third lunar month, King Taksin ordered Phra Thamtrilok, Phraya Rattanaphimon, and Phraya Chonburi to guard the royal camp at Pak Nam Ping. He then moved the royal army to establish at Bang Sai on the eastern bank to assist Phraya Ratcha Suphawadi.
That night, the Burmese attacked from the western bank, raiding Chaophraya Intharaphai’s camp at Tha Rong (the second camp). Fierce fighting ensued, but with 200 conscripted gunners dispatched by King Taksin, the Burmese failed to capture the camp and retreated.
At this time, Acha Wunkyi realized the Thai forces advancing from the south were stronger than expected. Fearing that dividing his forces from the siege of Phitsanulok might expose them to counterattacks from the two Chaophrayas in the north, he halted offensive operations against the Thonburi army.
Instead, he sent orders to 5,000 reinforcements at Sukhothai to detach and strike at the Thonburi army’s supply lines, deploying 3,000 troops for the operation. The remaining 2,000 soldiers were sent to reinforce the battle in Phitsanulok.
Second Phase of the Campaign
Upon seeing that the Burmese forces attacking the camps had withdrawn back toward Phitsanulok, King Taksin the Great prepared to strike the Burmese army besieging Phitsanulok. On Wednesday, the 13th day of the waxing moon, third lunar month, He commanded Phraya Ramanyawong to lead the Mon troops through Phitsanulok city to position close to the Burmese camps on the northern side.
Chaophraya Chakri and Chaophraya Surasi were ordered to increase their forces and set camps adjacent to the Burmese on the eastern side, while on the southern side, Phraya Nakhon Sawan, who was stationed at Wat Chan at the city’s rear, was assigned to extend wing-shaped camps to encircle the Burmese camps with several outposts.
The Burmese launched assaults on the Mon forces, but the Mon troops fired cannons causing heavy Burmese casualties and forced them to retreat to their camps. The Mon then established their camps firmly.
Meanwhile, Chaophraya Chakri and Chaophraya Surasi’s troops initially lost their camps to the Burmese, but Chaophraya Surasi led a counterattack, recapturing the camps and successfully driving the enemy back, establishing camps all around the Burmese positions.
When the Burmese counterattacked these camps, they were again defeated by the Thai forces. The Burmese then dug multiple trenches around their camps for protection as they continued assaults on the Thai camps.
The Thai forces responded by digging trenches that connected through the Burmese trenches, leading to fierce fighting in the trenches around each camp over several days. However, the Thai army was unable to break through the Burmese camps.
On Tuesday, the 2nd day of the waning moon, third lunar month, King Taksin arrived at the camp at Wat Chan at 10 p.m. He ordered all commanding officers encircling the Burmese to prepare for a coordinated attack. At 5 a.m., the signal was given for the Thai forces to launch a simultaneous, full-scale assault on the Burmese camps encircling the city’s eastern side.
The battle raged until dawn, but the Thai forces failed to penetrate the camps and had to withdraw.
Aware that the Thai had established close encirclement on the eastern side, Acha Wunkyi reinforced his troops there with his superior numbers and strengthened the defense.
Displeased at the failure to capture the camps, King Taksin convened a council of his commanders the next day at Wat Chan camp to deliberate the next strategy. It was agreed to change tactics:
Chaophraya Chakri and Chaophraya Surasi would combine their forces within the city and strike only at the southwestern Burmese camps.
Another division of the royal army would detach and maneuver to attack the Burmese from the rear, intending to encircle and break the enemy step by step.
Following this plan, King Taksin returned to establish the main royal camp at Tha Rong, the second defensive position below Pak Ping.
The Next Day, King Taksin the Great ordered the army of Phraya Nakhon Sawan, stationed at Wat Chan camp, to withdraw and join the royal army. He also commanded the forces of Phra Horathibodi and the Mon troops under Phraya Klang Mueang, who were at Bang Sai camp, to assemble and form a single army totaling 5,000 men.
He appointed Phraya Nakhon Sawan as the vanguard to advance and lie in ambush behind the Burmese camps on the western side. When the Burmese engaged in battle with Chaophraya Chakri’s forces, Phraya Nakhon Sawan was to launch a flanking attack.
King Taksin also ordered Phra Ratchasongkhram to bring additional artillery from the capital to support the campaign.
Meanwhile, the Burmese forces stationed at Sukhothai, following orders from Acha Wunkyi, divided their troops and marched toward Kamphaeng Phet. Their aim was to cut off Thai supply lines and then attack Phitsanulok as commanded.
The reconnaissance units of Phraya Sukhothai learned of the Burmese plan to advance on two fronts and reported it to King Taksin.
In response, King Taksin redeployed Phraya Ratchaphakdi and Phraya Phiphatkosat, who were stationed at Ban Kradat, to assist Phraya Rachasetthi in defending Nakhon Sawan.
He also ordered the Mon forces under Phraya Waeng to join Phra Luang Phakdi Songkhram’s army and quickly move to monitor the enemy at Ban Lan Dok Mai, Kamphaeng Phet district. Their mission was to discover which route the Burmese would take, to attack if favorable, or to retreat if overwhelmed.
Another army under Phraya Mahamontian was tasked with lying in ambush to flank the Burmese, supported by a separate unit led by Phraya Thammanun.
Chaophraya Chakri and Chaophraya Surasi led the main army to assault the Burmese camps encircling the city on the southwest side. They engaged the enemy, but the camps were not breached.
The supporting army intended to flank from another direction failed to arrive on schedule because Phraya Nakhon Sawan’s vanguard, part of Phraya Mahamontian’s forces, only advanced as far as Ban Som Poi, where they encountered Burmese troops and became engaged in combat, unable to advance further.
Thus, Chaophraya Chakri and Chaophraya Surasi had to hold their fortified camps.
What followed with Phraya Mahamontian’s forces remains unclear from the royal chronicles, but it is recorded that Phraya Nakhon Sawan’s troops returned to establish camp at Ban Kaek.
It is understood that when King Taksin saw that encircling the Burmese unseen was no longer feasible, he ordered the return of both Phraya Nakhon Sawan’s and Phraya Mahamontian’s armies.
Third Phase of the Campaign
When Acha Wunkyi saw the Thai forces that had camped along the river south of Phitsanulok moving away in several detachments, he sent Kalabo to lead a force to intercept and cut off the supply lines bringing provisions into Phitsanulok. The Burmese succeeded in raiding these supply lines multiple times.
On Friday, the 12th day of the waning moon, third lunar month, a report arrived from Bangkok stating that the Burmese had advanced through the Singkhon Pass and captured Kui and Pran cities. Krom Khun Anuraksangkharm, who defended Phetchaburi, led troops to set an ambush at the narrow pass in Phetchaburi province.
King Taksin, fearing the Burmese might invade Bangkok from this new direction, ordered Chao Prathumphaichit to lead a force back to defend the capital, causing the royal army to withdraw further.
Meanwhile, the Mon forces assigned by King Taksin under Phaya Cheng to ambush the Burmese at Kamphaeng Phet reached the area before the Burmese, who then set a blockade. When the Burmese forces moved from Sukhothai to Kamphaeng Phet, Phaya Cheng launched a surprise attack. The Burmese, taken unaware, fled, leaving weapons which were sent to King Taksin. However, as the Burmese elephant corps caught up, Phaya Cheng had to retreat, resorting to guerrilla tactics to gather intelligence on the Burmese.
The Burmese forces at Kamphaeng Phet were ordered by Acha Wunkyi to attack Nakhon Sawan, a crucial Thai supply depot, aiming to weaken the Thai forces aiding Phitsanulok.
King Taksin, aware of the Burmese strategy, ordered Phraya Ratchaphakdi and Phraya Phiphatkosat to retreat and join Phraya Rachasetthi in defending Nakhon Sawan. When the Burmese arrived at Kamphaeng Phet, Thai scouts reported strong defenses in Nakhon Sawan, causing the Burmese to halt and establish camps only at Kamphaeng Phet. They also dispatched guerrilla units through the western forests to circle behind Nakhon Sawan toward old Uthai Thani.
On Saturday, the 13th day of the waning moon, third lunar month, King Taksin received reports that the Burmese at Kamphaeng Phet had set camps at Ban Non Sala, Ban Thalok Bat, and Ban Luang, and that a division had moved toward Uthai Thani, burning parts of the town, though the Burmese route remained unknown.
On Tuesday, the 2nd day of the waxing moon, fourth lunar month, Phraya Rattanaphimol, defending the Pak Ping camp, reported Burmese scouts clearing forest to establish a camp in Khlong Ping, about three river bends away. King Taksin ordered Luang Wisut Yothamat and Luang Ratchayotathep to bring eight wagon-mounted cannons to reinforce the western side of Pak Ping camp. That same day, the Burmese set camps close to Phraya Thamma and Phraya Nakhon Sawan at Ban Khaek (four camps) and began clearing paths to establish a surrounding camp.
On Wednesday, the 3rd day of the waxing moon, fourth lunar month, King Taksin personally inspected from Tha Rong camp up to Ban Khaek, where the Burmese had established their encirclement camps. He ordered Phraya Siharajdechochai and Khun Tip Sen to join forces to support Phraya Nakhon Sawan in defending the camps, then returned to Tha Rong camp. During this council, the Burmese raided the Pak Ping camp, so King Taksin commanded Chaophraya Chakri to defend the royal camp while he led a fleet downriver from Tha Rong to aid Pak Ping. They remained until dawn, and seeing the Burmese did not advance further, King Taksin entrusted Phaya Thep Aroon and Phichit Narong with management of Pak Ping camp, then returned to Phitsanulok.
That night, upon arrival at Pak Ping, the Burmese attacked Phraya Thammatralok’s camp by Khlong Krapuang canal at 11 p.m. The fighting lasted until dawn. King Taksin crossed the pontoon bridge westward, personally leading reinforcements to defend Khlong Krapuang camp. He ordered Phraya Sukhothai to advance and establish wing-shaped camps with trenches linking to the besieged camp. He also sent Luang Raksa Yotha and Luang Phakdi Songkhram to establish camps adjacent to the Burmese near Khlong Krapuang. Luang Senapakdi led the Kaew Jindai forces to flank and attack the Burmese rear.
On Saturday, the 6th day of the waxing moon, fourth lunar month, the combined forces of Phraya Sukhothai, Luang Raksa Yotha, and Luang Senapakdi launched an assault on the Burmese camp at Khlong Krapuang. Despite fierce fighting and close combat, the Burmese, having superior numbers, held their ground.
On Sunday, the 7th day of the waxing moon, King Taksin ordered Chaophraya Intharaphai, commanding the Tha Rong camp, and the Mon forces under Phaya Klang Mueang to move down and assist in fighting the Burmese at Khlong Krapuang. He commanded the camps to be extended with wing-shaped outposts for a distance of 22 sen (about 2.15 kilometers). At dusk, the Burmese again launched raids on the Thai camps, engaging in battle. Unable to capture the camps, the Burmese settled in to siege positions. King Taksin then ordered Phaya Yamrach to come down from Wat Chan camp, granting him full authority to command all Thai forces fighting the Burmese at Khlong Krapuang.
Around Tuesday, the 9th day of the waxing moon in the 4th lunar month, Acha Wunkyi ordered Kalabo to lead forces to attack the Thai camp north of Pak Ping. Kalabo set up camp near Phraya Nakhon Sawan’s position on the west bank of the Kwai Yai River at Ban Kaek. On Thursday night, Kalabo sent troops across the river to raid the Krom Saeng Nai camp at Wat Prik on the east side. The defenders, only 240 men, could not hold the camp, and the Burmese captured all five eastern camps.
By Friday, the 12th day of the waxing moon, Phraya Nakhon Sawan reported that the Burmese had encircled his camp down to the riverbank and attacked the Wat Prik camps, breaking all five. Seeing the Burmese attempt to flank, he requested permission to withdraw his forces to the east side. King Taksin then ordered the royal army defending the palace, together with Phra Horathibodi’s forces at Khok Salud and Phraya Nakhon Chai Si’s troops at Pho Pratab Chang, to advance to Pak Ping. Mon troops under Phraya Klang Mueang, along with other forces combined as the Phra Yamarat army, marched to fight the Burmese at Wat Prik.
When they set camp, Kalabo attacked again. The Thai forces were initially unprepared, and the Burmese seized the camp. However, when the Phra Yamarat army arrived with full strength, they recaptured the camp, forcing the Burmese to retreat. Both sides then prepared for further battle. Meanwhile, Acha Wunkyi sent his younger brother Mang Yayoung to lead another Burmese force across the river to flank the royal army at Pak Ping from the east side, setting up multiple camps close to the royal army.
Fighting lasted several days, but the Thai forces could not break the Burmese lines. King Taksin realized the enemy was too strong and that staying at Pak Ping risked defeat. On the 10th day of the waning moon, 4th lunar month, he ordered the royal army to withdraw to Bang Khaotok in the Phichit region. Other government troops also withdrew in order.
Fourth Phase of the Campaign
Chaophraya Chakri returned to Phitsanulok and, after consulting with Chaophraya Surasi, agreed that their forces could no longer hold the city due to severe food shortages. They decided to abandon Phitsanulok. Troops stationed near the Burmese lines withdrew back inside the city. The Burmese closely followed, surrounding the city walls. Thai soldiers defended the city walls with artillery fire, preventing the Burmese from entering. The Burmese then withdrew to their own artillery positions and returned fire.
On Friday, the 11th day of the waning moon in the 4th lunar month, the two Chaophrayas learned that the royal army had already retreated the day before. They ordered their troops to increase artillery fire beyond previous days and raised music bands to create the illusion that they intended to hold the city for a long time. Then, they organized their forces into three divisions. Once the formations were ready, at 9 PM, the city gates were opened, and the army marched out to attack the Burmese camps to the east. The Thai forces broke through the Burmese lines, opening a path forward. The two Chaophrayas quickly advanced toward Ban Mung Don Chomphu.
Many civilians followed the armies. Some scattered and fled to join the royal army at Bang Khaotok, while others, exhausted, were captured by the pursuing Burmese. The two Chaophrayas then crossed the Banthat Range to regroup their troops at Phetchabun. Meanwhile, the Burmese besieged Phitsanulok for four months before capturing the city.
Knowing the Thai army had fled Phitsanulok, Acha Wunkyi occupied the city. Seeing the severe shortage of supplies, he dispatched two armies: one led by Mang Yayoung toward Phetchabun to gather provisions from Phetchabun and Lom Sak to send onward, possibly to harass the Chaophrayas again; another led by Kalabo advanced from Kamphaeng Phet to scout for supplies.
Shortly after, Acha Wunkyi received news that King Anawrahta had died and that Jingguja Rajabhutta ascended the throne, ordering all armies to return to Ava swiftly. Alarmed, Acha Wunkyi hastily gathered spoils and captives and retreated via Sukhothai, Tak, and Mae Lamao Pass, instructing Kalabo’s forces to await Mang Yayoung’s return before withdrawing together.
This left two Burmese armies stranded in Siamese territory, requiring months more of Thai efforts to suppress them. The Thai forces led by Phraya Phon Thep and Phraya Ratchaphakdi, moving toward Phetchabun, encountered Mang Yayoung’s forces near Ban Nai Mu south of Phetchabun. After heavy fighting, the Burmese fled north into Lan Chang territory and eventually retreated to Burma via Chiang Saen.
When King Taksin reached the royal camp at Chainat, he ordered Krom Khun Anuraksangkhom, Krom Khun Ramphu Bet, and Phraya Mahasena to attack Kalabo’s forces stationed at Nakhon Sawan and then follow with the royal army. However, by the 1st day of the waxing moon in the 8th lunar month, some unknown event occurred, and by the 3rd day of waxing moon, the king had returned to Thonburi without further details recorded.
The forces of Krom Khun Anuraksangkhom, Krom Khun Ramphu Bet, and Phraya Mahasena advanced to attack the Burmese camp at Nakhon Sawan, where the enemy numbered just over 1,000. The Thai army assaulted the camp, and the Burmese resisted fiercely, fighting in close combat for several days. King Taksin then led the royal army from Thonburi up to Chai Nat. Upon arrival, he received news that the Burmese had abandoned the camp at Nakhon Sawan and fled toward Uthai Thani. The king ordered the armies of Phra Yamarat, Phra Ratchasuphavadi, and the Mon forces under Phraya Ramanyawong to join forces with the army of Chao Anurutdeva, who had moved down earlier. Together, they pursued and defeated the Burmese at Ban Doem Bang Nang Buat in Suphanburi province. The Burmese fled toward the Three Pagodas Pass.
On Thursday, the 9th lunar month, waning moon day 2, King Taksin led the royal army from Chai Nat up to Tak. He ordered commanders to patrol and pursue the Burmese, capturing over 300 prisoners. The Burmese had fully retreated beyond the kingdom’s border, so the king returned to Thonburi.
This campaign of Acha Wunkyi’s northern invasion lasted from the 1st lunar month of the Year of the Sheep (2318 BE) until the 10th lunar month of the Year of the Monkey (2319 BE), a span of ten months. The war ended without a clear victory for either side.
Regarding the conflict of Acha Wunkyi in 2318–2319 BE, historical records remain somewhat unclear. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab (Krom Phraya Damrong) held that neither side won. However, Professor Khajorn Sukpanich, citing Burmese chronicles such as the Hokkew edition, Sir Arthur Phayre’s Burmese history, and Thai memoirs, argued otherwise.
The Hokkew Burmese chronicle records that after capturing Phitsanulok, Acha Wunkyi clashed with King Taksin’s forces at a river junction. Upon learning that King Mangra had died and his son Jingguja (Singu Min) had ascended the throne, Acha Wunkyi was ordered to retreat swiftly to Ava. When he returned, Acha Wunkyi—previously renowned for victories against China—was demoted and punished for poor leadership and lack of discipline, and for using ineffective tactics against the Thais.
This aligns with Sir Arthur Phayre’s account stating:
“…At the end of the rainy season, Mahasi Hsura (Acha Wunkyi) led an army through the Raeng Pass, met weak resistance, but internal disputes arose. The deputy commander Zeya Kyo disagreed with the battle plan, but Mahasi Hsura followed his own plan, capturing Phitsanulok and Sukhothai, yet suffered a crushing defeat and shameful retreat to the border… Many officers were executed; Mahasi Hsura was stripped of rank and disgraced…”
The Thai memoirs note:
“…In the Year of the Dragon, Mottama fell; Phraya Jeng and his Mon followers fled for protection under the king; Phraya Jabaan in Keng did not come down; the king led an unsuccessful attack, retreated and then returned to attack Chiang Mai again. At the end of the year, the Burmese pursued on five routes, with armies of ten thousands. Battles lasted three years; losing Phitsanulok, the Burmese dug tunnels into camps but were routed, and the king’s forces captured many Burmese, scattering their army…”
These sources show that while Acha Wunkyi initially captured Phitsanulok, King Taksin eventually routed his forces (Paradee Mahakhand, 1983: 24–25).
Note:
“Acha Wunkyi” is a Burmese noble title, known either as “Ahta Wunkyi” (Great Minister in charge of military taxes) or by royal style as “Wunkyi Mahasi Hsura.”
During the Thonburi period, the chronicles describe Acha Wunkyi as a key Burmese royal commander who had victories in China. In 2317 BE, when King Mangra prepared to invade Thonburi, he enlisted Mon forces to open roads. The Mon, displeased, rebelled and took Mottama, then launched attacks on Thaton and Hanthawaddy, intending to reach Yangon. Acha Wunkyi led forces to suppress them, pursuing the Mon down to Mottama. Phraya Jeng and other Mon leaders fled to seek refuge under the Thais at the Three Pagodas Pass.
Later, King Mangra ordered Acha Wunkyi to plan an invasion of Siam. Acha Wunkyi prepared his army by dividing it into two forces, advancing through Tak and pushing forward as far as Sukhothai. He then attempted to besiege Phitsanulok for a long time, where Chaophraya Chakri was acting as governor. Acha Wunkyi admired Chaophraya Chakri’s military skill so much that he requested to see him in person. Ultimately, the Thai forces were forced to abandon the city due to lack of supplies. This happened at the same time as King Mangra’s death. Jingguja Rajabhutta ascended the throne and ordered Acha Wunkyi to withdraw the army.
The later life of Acha Wunkyi is recorded differently in various sources, but according to the Thai Historical Encyclopedia, after Jingguja Rajabhutta ordered his withdrawal, he found reasons to strip Acha Wunkyi of his titles and ranks.
Subsequently, Acha Wunkyi allied with Atwan Wunk to depose King Jingguja and handed the throne to Mang Mong. However, Mang Mong ruled for only eleven days before King Bodawpaya captured and executed him. After ascending the throne, King Bodawpaya appointed Acha Wunkyi as viceroy, governing the southern provinces from Mottama until his death in 1790 CE (B.E. 2333).
The Ninth War: Burmese Invasion of Chiang Mai, | Year of the Monkey, B.E. 2319
The cause of this war was that King Jingguja, who had recently become the King of Ava, desired to conquer Chiang Mai, one of the 57 cities in the Lanna Thai region. He organized a Burmese-Mon army under Amalok Wunk as commander, with To Wunk and Phraya U Mon as deputies, advancing from Burma to join forces with the army of Po Ma Yung Wan stationed at Chiang Saen, intending to attack Chiang Mai together.
At that time, Phraya Ja Ban, whom King Taksin had appointed as Phraya Wichian Prakan, had ruled Chiang Mai since it was captured from the Burmese. Seeing the approaching Burmese army and recognizing the city’s limited defenses, he sent a report to Thonburi. Phraya Wichian Prakan then evacuated his family and fled Chiang Mai down to Sawankhalok.
When King Taksin learned that the Burmese were attacking Chiang Mai and that Phraya Wichian Prakan had abandoned the city, he ordered that Phraya Wichian Prakan be brought to Thonburi. The king then commanded Chaophraya Surasi to lead the northern provincial forces, join with Phraya Kawila, the ruler of Nakhon Lampang, and march to recapture Chiang Mai.
The Thai forces advanced, and the Burmese were unable to hold the city, so they abandoned Chiang Mai and retreated.
When the Burmese retreated from Chiang Mai, King Taksin reflected that the city’s population and forces had become greatly scattered and weakened. Gathering the city back into a proper town was difficult, and there were not enough people to defend it. If the Thai army withdrew and the Burmese returned, Chiang Mai would likely be lost again. Therefore, the king ordered Chiang Mai to be abandoned. From that time on, Chiang Mai remained a deserted city for over 15 years, until it was reestablished during the reign of King Rama I of the Rattanakosin era.
This ninth war was the last major conflict between Siam and Burma during the Thonburi period, as recorded in Thai Fight Burma by Somdet Phra Chao Borom Wong Ther Krom Phraya Damrong Rajanubhab (excerpted from the book Somdet Phra Taksin Chom Bodin Maharaj, by Sanan Silakorn, 1988: 66–88).
10.2.2 The elimination of Burmese influence from Lanna Thailand
The Lanna Kingdom was a territory bridging the northern Thai kingdoms and Burma, comprising Chiang Mai, Lampang, Lamphun, Phrae, and Nan—autonomous regions ruled by local lords. This region held strategic importance for both Siam and Burma, who competed fiercely to assert their dominance there.
Control over Lanna shifted between Burma and Siam (Ayutthaya), depending on which power held greater strength at the time. Since Chiang Mai fell to Burma under King Bayinnaung in 1558 CE (B.E. 2101), efforts to revive and resist Burmese rule—known as “fuen man” (anti-Burmese resistance)—have occurred intermittently within Chiang Mai.
These resistance movements met with varying success, especially during times of internal Burmese political turmoil, such as from 1727 to 1763 CE (B.E. 2270–2306), under the leadership of Thep Singh of Muang Yuam. However, Burmese forces eventually suppressed these uprisings and reasserted control. (Somchote Ongsakul, 2002:1)
Map showing the Lanna Thai Kingdom
(Image from the book Maps and Geography: Sentences for Lower and Upper Secondary Education)
During the reign of King Taksin the Great, after he successfully unified the various principalities into one kingdom in 1770 (B.E. 2313), He led an army to attack Chiang Mai in order to eliminate Burmese influence once and for all.
It is recorded that in the third lunar month of the year of the Tiger (B.E. 2313), Po Ma Yung Wan led the Chiang Mai forces to besiege Sawankhalok. By the fourth lunar month of the same year, King Taksin had already marched his army from the capital towards Chiang Mai. From the records, it can be inferred that when Phraya Phichai Racha learned that the Burmese were advancing, a dispatch was sent down to inform King Taksin. As the Burmese forces reached Sawankhalok, another message likely followed. This notice probably arrived at the capital in the third lunar month, around the time King Taksin had just returned from the northern campaign and had not yet dispersed his troops and transport.
Upon learning that Po Ma Yung Wan, the ruler of Chiang Mai, personally led the army, King Taksin grew concerned. The northern cities had just recently been reclaimed; the population was not yet stable or fully loyal, having only recently been enemies. For this reason, he quickly gathered forces into the royal army and marched back north in the fourth lunar month.
By the time he reached near Nakhon Sawan, news came that the northern people had already banded together, fought, and defeated the Burmese forces, who had fled. King Taksin then chose not to return to the capital but proceeded to Phichai, where he summoned the provincial armies to join him before continuing onward to attack Chiang Mai.
The reason King Taksin led the first campaign against Chiang Mai appears to have been a strategic calculation. The Burmese forces in Chiang Mai were relatively weak at that time, and the main Burmese power at Ava was still engaged in conflict with China and unable to send reinforcements. The recent loss of Chiang Mai from Sawankhalok had likely left the Burmese forces shaken. If the Siamese army pressed forward quickly, it might be possible to capture Chiang Mai.
Moreover, both the royal army and the provincial armies were already assembled and ready to move; there was no need to conscript more soldiers. Success in capturing Chiang Mai would have been a significant advantage, effectively cutting Burmese power and preventing them from attacking, similar to what had happened in the Ayutthaya era. Even if the campaign failed, it would still benefit Siam by providing important knowledge of the terrain for future planning.
Therefore, King Taksin advanced to attack Chiang Mai at the beginning of the year of the Rabbit (B.E. 2314).
The army of King Taksin the Great that marched to attack Chiang Mai for the first time proceeded by waterborne procession from the capital to assemble forces at the city of Phichai. The total force, comprising Siamese, Chinese, Indian, and European troops, numbered 15,000. He appointed Phraya Surasi as the vanguard commander to lead the provincial troops forward, while King Taksin himself, as supreme commander, led the royal army following by land route through Sawankhalok, Thoen, and Li.
At that time, Chao Mang Chai, lord of Phrae, came down with his nobles and subjects to pay homage and requested to become a tributary state. King Taksin graciously granted him the title Phra Ya Srisuriyawong and incorporated him into the army. The king then commanded Chaophraya Chakri Khak and Phra Maharajakhru Prarohitachari to oversee the naval fleet stationed at Phichai. Thereafter, the royal army proceeded by land.
King Taksin rode his royal elephant, traveling and camping for many days until reaching the district of Kumlueang, where he halted and encamped at a pavilion built at the foothills of Mount Ma Plat. The local guide informed the king that crossing the mountain to the other side would be a great distance without any water sources, and the troops would suffer thirst in the harsh terrain. Upon hearing this, King Taksin said, “Do not trouble yourselves; this is my concern. Tonight, under no circumstance shall the evening gong be sounded; measure only the hours. At eleven o’clock, I shall summon rain to fall.”
The king then ordered Phraya Ratchaprasit to erect a shrine and conduct a ritual sacrifice to the celestial deities atop the mountain. Upon completing the rite, King Taksin solemnly vowed that by the power of his sacred accumulated merit through countless past lives until this present existence, may it be a refuge for all the troops, and by the divine might of the gods, may torrents of rain descend this very night to be plainly witnessed.
On that night, the sky was clear without clouds. By the power of his vow and the deities, at exactly 10:48 p.m., a great downpour fell heavily, flooding the entire forest—a marvel beyond measure.
By dawn, King Taksin mounted his royal elephant and led the brave army to cross the mountain by the established land route, journeying smoothly until reaching Lamphun.
Meanwhile, Po Ma Yung Wan, lord of Chiang Mai, seeing the enemy advance swiftly, chose not to engage in battle en route but rather formed his troops to encamp outside the city. The army of Phraya Surasi arrived and assaulted the Burmese camp, defeating them soundly. Po Ma Yung Wan then withdrew his forces into the city and secured the fortifications firmly.
The vanguard army advanced and entered the outer earthen wall, then established camps surrounding the inner wall. Meanwhile, the royal army moved in to set up the main camp within the earthen wall. King Taksin the Great then commanded both the vanguard and the royal army to launch a raid, placing ladders against the inner wall and attempting to scale it during the night for about three hours to test the enemy’s strength.
The Burmese soldiers and the local defenders guarding the ramparts fiercely resisted with cannon fire and close combat weapons. The battle continued until dawn, but the Thai forces could not capture the city. King Taksin then declared, “Chiang Mai has very strong fortifications. It has long been said since the Ayutthaya era that any king who attacks Chiang Mai for the first time will fail and must attack a second time to succeed…”
The army, lacking sufficient troops and supplies for prolonged siege, quickly withdrew. This confirmed the ancient prophecy. King Taksin stayed in Chiang Mai for nine days before ordering the royal army to retreat a day early, followed by the vanguard army withdrawing later.
At that time, Po Ma Yung Wan, lord of Chiang Mai, seeing the Thai retreat, took the opportunity to send forces to pursue and attack. The Burmese troops harassed and ambushed the rear Thai forces, causing disorder and panic. When the fighting reached the royal army, King Taksin, the heroic sovereign, personally led the rear guard into battle, drawing his sword and engaging the enemy himself. The soldiers, inspired by his courage, rallied and fiercely fought back. Many Burmese soldiers were killed, and the enemy was forced to retreat.
From then on, the Siamese army was able to withdraw safely. King Taksin returned to the royal barge at Phichai and sailed back to the capital.
The Second Siege of Chiang Mai
Later, in 1773 (B.E. 2316), Pa Kan Hwon, the governor of Pagan who had been promoted to governor of Mottama (Mergui) and commander of the southern Mon border provinces, received orders from King Mangra to muster 3,000 Mon soldiers from border towns adjacent to Siam. Along with 500 Burmese troops led by Paekitcha, they were tasked with building a road. The army was to advance via the Three Pagodas Pass.
Because the route crossed the difficult Banthat mountain range, the plan included building granaries along the way at intervals from the foot of the mountain on the Burmese side to Sam Sop and Tha Din Daeng in Siamese territory, to avoid the need to carry large supplies for the campaign.
The Mon people naturally disliked the Burmese, as they had long been oppressed and mistreated by them. When the Burmese conscripted the Mon to build roads, the Mon were forced to comply unwillingly. Four Mon leaders came with them: Phra Ya Cheng, the lord of Terein, who was the senior leader; Phra Ya U; Talasiang; and Talaklep.
While these Mon were working in the forests of Mottama, Pa Kan Hwon conscripted another group of Mon into the army. Some tried to escape, so the Burmese captured their family members as hostages. They took relatives and kin of the Mon road workers and imprisoned them, subjecting them to harsh treatment.
Some who managed to escape returned to warn the Mon workers. Filled with anger and resentment over the Burmese exploiting their labor while oppressing their families behind, the Mon conspired together. The leaders and commoners colluded to kill the Burmese soldiers stationed at Tha Din Daeng in Siamese territory. After this, the Mon united and formed an army to return to their homeland.
Noble Mon Woman
(Image from the book Burmese King Bayinnaung and Yodin Naratha)
The Mon people living in the towns along the route heard the news and came in great numbers to join with Phra Ya Cheng’s forces. The Mon rebels, seeing their strength grow, advanced directly to attack the city of Mottama. They raided the city by night, loudly shouting in Thai to deceive the Burmese into thinking that a Siamese army had arrived. Pakhan Hwon and the Burmese commanders, caught unprepared and alarmed, fled without fighting, abandoning the city and escaping by boat back to Rangoon. The Mon then took control of Mottama. The Mon leaders, seeing this as an opportunity to unify the Mon towns into a strong front against the Burmese, convened and persuaded many Mon from Mottama and nearby towns to join them. Under Phra Ya Cheng’s command, the large Mon army advanced to attack the cities of Thaton and Hongsawadi, successfully capturing both, as the populations were Mon and offered no resistance. Emboldened, they then marched on to attack Rangoon itself, engaging in fierce battles with the Burmese forces.
Since learning that the Burmese were preparing to march their army to invade Siam, King Taksin the Great of Thonburi had already resolved to resist. When news arrived that the Mon had rebelled against the Burmese and the uprising had spread widely, he judged that the Burmese would be occupied suppressing the Mon rebellion for some time and would not be able to immediately invade Siam. This presented an opportunity to strike at Chiang Mai, thereby weakening the Burmese forces before they could fully mobilize.
Hence, His Majesty issued a royal command to muster 20,000 troops from the northern frontier towns to assemble and await His arrival at Ban Ra Haeng, Tak region. Meanwhile, 15,000 soldiers were recruited from the capital and the inner towns to form the royal army.
King Taksin himself embarked on a royal barge, ten wah long, rowed by forty oarsmen, accompanied by numerous vessels carrying officials, military officers, Chinese and Thai civilians, and troops. The great naval procession departed Thonburi by waterway on Tuesday, 11th waning day of the twelfth lunar month, year of the Horse (B.E. 2317). Traveling along the route, His Majesty stopped to rest at Kamphaeng Phet on Wednesday, 4th waxing day of the first lunar month, then proceeded to Ban Ra Haeng, Tak — the present-day site of Tak city — where He stayed at the Mango Garden Palace and held a council of war.
While King Taksin and his forces were assembled at Tak, news came that King Mang Ra had dispatched the royal prince and great general Ahsa Wun Gyi to suppress the Mon rebels who had attacked the city of Rangoon. The Mon had been defeated and fled southwards.
Concerned by this, King Taksin realized that the time to attack Chiang Mai was now short, as the Burmese army was pursuing the Mon down to Mottama, and the Mon were likely to seek refuge under His Majesty’s protection, as they had once done during the Ayutthaya period. The Burmese, no doubt, would soon march their forces southwards.
Yet, to abandon the campaign against Chiang Mai after having brought the army as far as Tak would be regrettable. If Chiang Mai could be taken before the Burmese approached from the south, the war would be easier as the Burmese northern forces would be weakened. But if the city was not taken quickly, or if the campaign took too long, the Burmese might then strike from behind, attacking Thonburi via Kanchanaburi and Tak, severing the vital communications with the capital.
Therefore, King Taksin resolved to swiftly conquer Chiang Mai before returning to face the Burmese threat in the south. He commanded Chaophraya Chakri (Nai Thong Duang) to lead the northern frontier forces against Chiang Mai, accompanied by Chaophraya Surasi (Nai Sud Jinda). Meanwhile, the royal army remained at Tak awaiting news of the Burmese movements. Chaophraya Chakri and Chaophraya Surasi advanced through Thoen and Nakhon Lampang as directed.
When Po Supla learned that the Siamese army was advancing, he assigned Po Ma Yung Wan, the governor of Chiang Mai, to defend the city. He also organized a force under Phaya Cha Ban and Phaya Kawila, commanding 1,000 local troops as the vanguard to advance first. Po Supla himself led the main army of 9,000 soldiers, intending to make a stand at Nakhon Lampang.
Phaya Cha Ban and Phaya Kawila, who were ethnic Lanna Siamese, were forced to serve under the Burmese. Upon arriving at Nakhon Lampang, they learned that the southern Siamese forces were advancing with sufficient strength to offer support. They then led the vanguard troops to pledge allegiance to Chaophraya Chakri (the Siamese commander). Phaya Cha Ban and Phaya Kawila took the oath of loyalty by holding the sacred water of the Phra Phithak Satta (a traditional oath) and were then tasked with leading the Lanna troops to join the Siamese army in advancing toward Chiang Mai.
When Po Supla’s main force was still en route, he discovered that Phaya Cha Ban and Phaya Kawila had defected to the Siamese side, causing him great alarm. He hastily ordered a retreat back to defend Chiang Mai. The Burmese then established a camp along the old Ping River bank north of Lamphun to block the Siamese advance, while Po Supla and Po Ma Yung Wan prepared to resist at Chiang Mai itself.
Regarding this episode of Chiang Mai, Somdet Krom Phraya Damrong Rajanubhab wrote in Thai Wars with Burma:
“The defection of Phaya Cha Ban and Phaya Kawila to the Siamese side is recorded both in Burmese chronicles and the Yonok legends. It is said that when King Anwa appointed Po Ma Yung Wan as governor of Chiang Mai, four prominent local lords remained in power: Phaya Saen Luang, Phaya Sam Lan, Phaya Cha Ban, and Phaya Kawila, the governor of Nakhon Lampang.
When Po Ma Yung Wan became governor, he curtailed the powers and privileges of these local lords, which caused dissatisfaction among them. However, fearing the Burmese overlords, they remained silent. When a war with China threatened the Burmese city, King Anwa summoned the Chiang Mai forces to help defend it. Phaya Cha Ban and Phaya Kawila led troops for this campaign.
After the war ended, they petitioned King Mang Ra (Maha Thiri Thudhamma Raja) to restore their authority and privileges as before. Seeing their loyalty and service, the king granted their request, issuing royal orders to that effect, which Phaya Cha Ban then brought back to Chiang Mai.”
Chiang Mai sent the younger brother to carry the royal proclamation to place at the Royal Plaza. Po Ma Yung Wan was already displeased and refused to accept the proclamation, claiming that Phaya Ja Ban’s failure to personally place the seal was against protocol and an insult to the honor of King Anwa. Po Ma Yung Wan ordered his officers to arrest Phaya Ja Ban, but the latter resisted and refused to comply. This led to a violent clash between Po Ma Yung Wan’s men and the defenders of Phaya Ja Ban, resulting in casualties on both sides.
Phaya Ja Ban fled Chiang Mai and went to seek refuge with Po Supla, the Burmese general stationed at Vientiane in the year of the Snake, B.E. 2316, reporting the oppression by Po Ma Yung Wan. Po Supla, who disliked Po Ma Yung Wan, took Phaya Ja Ban into his forces and returned with him to Chiang Mai.
Po Ma Yung Wan complained to King Anwa about the alleged rebellion of Phaya Ja Ban and Phaya Kawila. When the Siamese army later advanced, Po Supla assigned Phaya Ja Ban to lead troops downstream to clear river obstacles for the naval forces headed to Tak. Po Ma Yung Wan objected, claiming Phaya Ja Ban was a criminal and demanded his handover. Po Supla refused, stating Phaya Ja Ban was needed to command local troops already enlisted, who would not obey an outsider.
Frustrated, Po Ma Yung Wan then seized Prince Chai Kaeo, father of Phaya Kawila, and the families of Phaya Ja Ban as hostages, sending them to Ava. Upon learning this, Phaya Ja Ban, who was at Hod, killed the Burmese guards and led his followers to pledge allegiance to Chaophraya Chakri, joining the Siamese army advancing to Lampang.
Phaya Kawila, learning of his father’s capture, killed the Burmese commander at Lampang and hurried to rescue his family and the families of Phaya Ja Ban. After this, Phaya Kawila pledged loyalty to Siam, welcomed the Siamese army into Lampang, and volunteered to continue fighting the Burmese.
When Chaophraya Chakri’s army took Lampang, King Taksin was at Ban Ra Haeng, Tak. A group of Mon families fleeing the Burmese through Tak arrived. Khun Inthakiri, the local official, brought their leader, Sming Suhai Klun, to the king. King Taksin learned the Mon had been defeated by the Burmese at Rangoon, and that Ahsa Wun Gyi was pursuing them.
Simultaneously, Chaophraya Chakri reported that Phaya Ja Ban and Phaya Kawila had led the people of Chiang Mai and Lampang to join Siam. Seeing advantage in the northern campaign, King Taksin ordered Phaya Yommarat Khaek to lead troops to set up a checkpoint at Tha Din Daeng, near Sai Yok River, to intercept the Mon families entering through Phra Chedi Sam Ong pass. He also assigned Phaya Kamhaeng Wichit to command 2,000 soldiers at Ban Ra Haeng to guard the Mon families entering through Tak.
On Friday, the 5th waning day of the first lunar month, a heavy rainstorm blessed the day as an auspicious sign. King Taksin mounted his war elephant Phang Thep Lila and led the royal army by land. After many days, he arrived at Pa Myeo Nuea, Lampang, and then proceeded to Lamphun.
On Tuesday, the 2nd waxing day of the second lunar month, he ordered a camp to be established at Lamphun. By then, Chaophraya Chakri’s forces had reached the river near Chiang Mai. The Burmese army dug trenches along the riverbanks to resist and prevent the Siamese crossing. Unable to cross, Chaophraya Chakri was informed by Muen Sri Hathep of the situation, who asked King Taksin to authorize the use of cannon fire to break the Burmese lines.
King Taksin commanded the construction of artillery platforms and the Siamese forces bombarded the Burmese trenches, breaking their defenses. Chaophraya Chakri then led the army to cross the river. The Burmese retreated to Chiang Mai, while the royal army established camp in Lamphun.
Chaophraya Chakri, Chaophraya Surasi, and Chaophraya Sawankhalok followed and besieged Chiang Mai with thirty-four camps, extending wings on three sides. On the northern side, Chaophraya Sawankhalok was still completing his camp.
Chaophraya Chakri sent Phraya Thibebodi to report progress to King Taksin, who was delighted upon hearing the news. The king gifted royal horses and pistols to Chaophraya Chakri, Chaophraya Surasi, and Chaophraya Sawankhalok as tokens of honor.
The northern and southern fronts of the war grew more intense. Shortly after King Taksin arrived in Lamphun, news arrived from Tak that the Burmese were pursuing Mon families through Ban Na Ko Dok Lek in Tak, with about 2,000 troops. King Taksin ordered 1,800 troops from the royal army under Chao Ram Lak, the king’s nephew, to move to Ban Chom Thong to confront the Burmese approaching Ban Na Ko Dok Lek. Later, news from Tak reported Mon leaders Suwan Thewa and Thamu Muay leading Mon families from Mueang Roeng arriving in Tak, initially numbering about 1,000. At Uwa B village, the Burmese caught up, and the Mon families
The fighting continued, and they shot dead Chak Kai Wot, a Burmese commander, causing the enemy to flee toward Ban Na Ko Dok Lek. Upon learning this, King Taksin thought that the Burmese forces pursuing the Mon families were not as strong as previously reported from Tak. Therefore, he ordered Phraya Ram Lak’s army to return to assist in the fighting near Chiang Mai. He also issued an order to Phraya Kamhaeng Wichit to split forces at Tak, setting up a camp to guard the checkpoint at Ban Na Ko Dok Lek, awaiting the Mon families who would follow later.
Meanwhile, at Chiang Mai, Chaophraya Chakri sent Phaya Wichit Navi to report that once the northern camps were established, they could jointly raid Chiang Mai at once. King Taksin heard this and disagreed, stating that the Burmese had entrenched themselves inside the city and would fiercely defend it. If the troops rushed in recklessly, they might suffer losses and be forced to retreat.
He advised that once the city was fully surrounded, the attack should focus specifically on a chosen point. All camps should dig defensive trenches against the enemy, but the camps closest to the city should dig canals as cover from Burmese fire. Wherever a camp was near the city walls, canals should be dug and lined with spikes to block the enemy. Even if the enemy tried to break out, the troops should press and pursue them into the city immediately.
Phaya Wichit Navi respectfully returned to report these orders to Chaophraya Chakri, who proceeded to prepare accordingly.
Po Supla and Po Ma Yung Wan, the Burmese commanders defending Chiang Mai, saw the Siamese forces setting camps around the city. They came out to make raids on the Siamese camps several times but were repelled each time with heavy casualties. Eventually, the Burmese retreated to their camps.
Once, the Burmese attacked Chaophraya Chakri’s camp to the west during daytime, but he showed no fear, calmly playing chess inside the camp while ordering the artillery to fire on the Burmese. Many Burmese fell from cannon fire, and they were unable to capture the camp, so they withdrew. This discouraged the Burmese troops, who then focused on defending the city.
Meanwhile, the local people of Chiang Mai, hiding in the forests, saw the Siamese camps surrounding the Burmese and gradually came out in large numbers to join the Siamese army. Even those inside the city escaped and joined the Siamese forces, adding more than 5,000 Chiang Mai people to the Siamese side.
On Saturday, the 13th day of the waxing moon in the 2nd month, at dawn, King Taksin donned full royal battle attire and armed himself. Mounted on the royal elephant Plai Kachentrabanyong, he led the royal army from the camp near Lamphun to Chiang Mai, stopping at Phlapphla Chai, about 34.33 kilometers from Chiang Mai. He then moved the royal army to camp along the Ping River near the city and inspected the camps surrounding Chiang Mai.
With the intent to capture Chiang Mai quickly, on that day, Chaophraya Chakri launched an assault on the Burmese camps outside the city, attacking the southern and western sides and breaking all enemy camps.
Chaophraya Surasi then led the army to attack the Burmese camps positioned at the eastern Tha Phae Gate, successfully capturing all three camps. That night, Po Supla and Po Ma Yung Wan abandoned Chiang Mai, evacuating the people through the Chang Phueak Gate, where Chaophraya Sawankhalok’s forces had not yet completed surrounding the city, allowing the Thai forces to break through. The Thai army pursued and inflicted heavy casualties on the Burmese, recovering many of the captured families.
The next day, Sunday, the 14th day of the waxing moon, Year of the Horse 2317 BE, King Taksin led a grand royal procession into Chiang Mai. Mounted on the royal elephant, he inspected the camps encircling the city. All generals and commanders came to pay respects. The King asked, “By whose skillful stratagem did the Burmese flee this time?” Chaophraya Chakri and the commanders replied in unison that it was truly by the divine power (krittadecha nupap). They recounted that Buddhist monks in the city had foretold an earthquake on the night of Friday, 12th waxing moon, which occurred, and by dawn, the royal army had arrived.
King Taksin graciously bestowed ceremonial military attire and patterned cloth upon Chaophraya Chakri and Chaophraya Surasi as equal rewards. He then ordered punishment for Chaophraya Sawankhalok, who had failed to complete his military duties and allowed the Burmese to escape, sentencing him to fifty lashes and confinement.
Upon capturing Chiang Mai, King Taksin acquired a vast amount of weaponry and war supplies, including 2,110 cannons of various sizes, 220 horses, 32 pairs of gongs, 500 Mon families, and over 500 people from Sawankhalok. The King rejoiced greatly that the campaign succeeded as desired, especially because taking Chiang Mai had been a decisive move.
Considering the risks and benefits, the campaign was fraught with danger. Had they lost or been bogged down in prolonged warfare, Burmese forces could have counterattacked and cut off supply lines, threatening Tak and the capital. Thai troops were already engaged near Chiang Mai, which made this daring attack even more critical.
King Taksin was deeply concerned until Chiang Mai was secured. Historical chronicles and old records reveal that during the sieges led by Chaophraya Chakri and Chaophraya Surasi, King Taksin personally ordered his envoys to gather detailed battle reports at every stage. When an envoy returned, he reported that Chaophraya Chakri had captured the Burmese camps to the southwest, while another messenger informed that Chaophraya Surasi had seized the camps near the city gates.
The Burmese had already lost control of the eastern Tha Phae Gate. Upon hearing this, King Taksin clapped both hands beside his mouth and said, “Now, who should I call brother or younger brother in this matter?” This reflected his relief and joy, knowing the Burmese had no way to resist and that Chiang Mai would surely fall within a day or two, just as he wished.
On Wednesday, the 2nd month, waning moon 2nd night, in the morning, King Taksin proceeded to pay homage to the Buddha image, Phra Phuttha Sihing, in Chiang Mai. He also inspected the house of Po Ma Yung Wan, the Burmese ruler of the city.
On Thursday, King Taksin held a royal audience in the throne hall where nobles, officials, military, and civilians gathered. He graciously appointed Phraya Ja Baan as Phraya Wichian Prakarn, granting him authority over Chiang Mai. He appointed Phraya Kawila as governor of Lampang, and Phraya Lamphun as Phraya Waiwongsa, continuing his rule over Lamphun. He also appointed subordinate officials throughout and ordered Chaophraya Chakri to assist in organizing governance to restore order.
Shortly after taking Chiang Mai, a report arrived from Tak that a Burmese army was advancing again, pursuing the Mon families into the borderlands. Having assigned duties and affairs, King Taksin stayed seven days in Chiang Mai before departing on a Friday morning, waning moon 4th night of the 2nd month. He stopped to rest at Lampang, paid respects to the sacred relics of Wat Phra That, offering flowers of gold and silver, then hurriedly marched the royal army back to Tak.
Meanwhile, Chaophraya Chakri, stationed in Chiang Mai, sent emissaries to persuade the dispersed villagers hiding in forests and remote valleys to return to their homes. The people of Lanna, being of Thai ethnicity but under Burmese control, gladly accepted the return of Thai rule without force. Even the prince of Nan pledged allegiance, making Nan another vassal city under Siam.
Thus, with King Taksin’s campaign to capture Chiang Mai, Siam expelled Burmese influence from the northern Lanna region, regaining Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Lampang, Nan, and Phrae into the Siamese kingdom since the Year of the Horse 2317 BE, and maintaining sovereignty to this day.
King Taksin the Great stayed overnight at the city of Tak, a city where he once served as its lord during his time in Ayutthaya. He visited Wat Khoi Khao Kaew and Wat Klang to pay homage to the Buddha image at Wat Klang. He also visited and encouraged the monks and novices there, recalling the solemn vows and sacred pledges he had made before. The monks all blessed him, saying, “Truly as Your Majesty has declared.”
On Thursday, the 3rd lunar month, the 9th waxing day, King Taksin embarked on the royal barge and traveled down the river by waterway. After five days of journeying, he arrived at the capital, Krung Thonburi.
Note:
When King Ava appointed Po Ma Yung Wan as the ruler of Chiang Mai, there were four principal nobles in Chiang Mai holding great power: Phraya Cha Luang, Phraya Sam Lan, Phaya Cha Ban, and Phraya Kawila, the ruler of Nakhon Lampang.
The lineage of Phraya Kawila
Phraya Kawila was the son of Prince Kaew, whom King Ava had appointed as ruler of Nakhon Lampang. Thus, he was often called Prince Kaew. He had seven sons, collectively known as the Seven Lords, and three daughters, making a total of ten children, listed as follows:
King Kawila, the first ruler of Chiang Mai
(Image from the book His Majesty the King in the Chakri Dynasty and Chiang Mai)
Note:
When King Ava appointed Po Ma Yung Wan as ruler of Chiang Mai, there were four principal nobles holding power in Chiang Mai: Phraya Cha Luang, Phraya Sam Lan, Phaya Cha Ban, and Phraya Kawila, the ruler of Nakhon Lampang.
Lineage of Phraya Kawila
Phraya Kawila was the son of Prince Kaew, whom King Ava appointed as ruler of Nakhon Lampang, thus he was called Prince Kaew. He had seven sons (known as the Seven Lords) and three daughters, totaling ten children, as follows:
Son named Kawila — When Po Ma Yung Wan became ruler of Chiang Mai, he apparently did not trust Prince Kaew, so he ordered Prince Kaew to assist the administration in Chiang Mai. This Phraya Kawila later became ruler of Chiang Mai in the reign of King Rama I, who elevated his rank to ruler of Chiang Mai.
Son named Kham Som — Became Phraya of Nakhon Lampang during the reign of King Rama I.
Son named Noi Tham — Became Phraya of Chiang Mai during the reign of King Rama II, known as Phraya Chiang Mai Chang Phueak because he presented the sacred white elephant (Sevata Airam) to King Rama II.
Son named Duangthip became ruler of Nakhon Lampang in the reign of King Rama II.
Daughter named Sirichana (called Chao Si Anocha or Chao Dok Fa Si Anocha by the people of Lanna) became the principal consort (Phra Akkharaya) of Krom Phrarajawang Bowon Mahasurasi Hanat (the title of Chao Phraya Surasi in the Thonburi period).
Daughter named Sripanya died young.
A son named Mulha became ruler of Chiang Mai in the reign of King Rama II.
Son named Khamphan became ruler of Chiang Mai in the reign of King Rama II. The people of Chiang Mai called him “Chao Luang Setthi” or “Chao Luang Setthi Khamphan.”
Daughter named Sriboonthan died young.
Son named Boonma became ruler of Nakhon Lamphun in the reign of King Rama III.
(References: Samak Chaiyakomin, 2543 BE: 127–128; Rulers of Chiang Mai [http://www.yupparaj.ac.th/webpage/computer/student/topic9/index.html], accessed 10 September 2547 BE)
Chao Luang Setthi Khamphan, the third ruler of Chiang Mai
(Image from the book His Majesty the King in the Chakri Dynasty and Chiang Mai)
10.3 Which cities did King Taksin wage wars against to expand the Thai kingdom?
The exercise of royal power and the expansion of the Thai kingdom during the Thonburi period.
10.3.1 Nakhon Si Thammarat City
At the end of the year 1768 (B.E. 2311), after King Taksin had taken Nakhon Ratchasima and suppressed the Phimai rebellion, he had thus expanded the kingdom’s territory fully to the east, similar to the Ayutthaya period. He then gave orders to prepare the army to march down and attack Nakhon Si Thammarat City to suppress the rebellion of the local lord (Noo).
Map showing the boundaries of Nakhon Si Thammarat Province
(Image from the research report in response to the royal initiative, titled “Nakhon Si Thammarat”)
When the army was ready to suppress the rebellion of the local lord (Noo) of Nakhon Si Thammarat,
King Taksin appointed Chaophraya Chakri Khak (formerly Luang Nai Sak, of Indian descent during the Ayutthaya period) as the supreme commander, with Phra Yommarat, Phaya Sriphipat, and Phaya Phetchaburi as generals, commanding a land force of 5,000 men to march and attack Nakhon Si Thammarat around the fifth lunar month of 1769 (B.E. 2312). At that time, King Taksin intended to remain in Thonburi to await news of the campaign. The army led by Chaophraya Chakri (Khak) reached Chumphon and Chaiya, where the old administrators submitted peacefully without battle. However, the commanding officers who led the campaign were not united. When they advanced into Nakhon Si Thammarat territory, crossing the Tapi River (in present-day Surat Thani) to Tha Mak in Lamphun district, they encountered enemy forces camped to block their way. The Thonburi army attacked prematurely without full readiness and suffered defeat. Phaya Sriphipat and Phaya Phetchaburi were killed in battle, and the enemy captured Luang Laksamana, son of Chaophraya Chakri (Khak). Chaophraya Chakri (Khak) then retreated and stationed his forces at Chaiya.
King Taksin received a report from Phra Yommarat stating that Chaophraya Chakri Khak was neglecting his military duties. Upon learning this, King Taksin considered that the current army would likely fail to capture Nakhon Si Thammarat. At that time, the royal army was still preparing to attack the Khmer capital. Then news arrived that the cities of Siem Reap and Battambang had already been taken and occupied by two prominent commanders, Phraya Aphaironrit (later King Rama I) and Phraya Anuchitrat (later Chaophraya Surasi).
King Taksin then decided to attack Nakhon Si Thammarat first before moving on to Cambodia. He ordered the preparation of a naval force with about 10,000 soldiers, armed with cannons and weapons.
At an auspicious time, King Taksin boarded the royal barge Suwanpichai, which was 11 wa long and over 3 wa wide, with 29 rowers and accompanied by warships commanded by high-ranking officers. The fleet set off from Thonburi via the water route, leaving Samut Songkhram mouth and heading to sea.
On the 3rd waning day of the 9th lunar month, B.E. 2312, at 3 a.m., near Bang Thalu (today’s Hat Chao Samran, Phetchaburi Province), a severe storm arose. Some warships sank or were damaged, and others sought shelter in bays. King Taksin ordered the fleet to anchor and build a temporary pavilion onshore, holding a ceremony to worship the guardian deities of the sea, offering incense and prayers. He solemnly vowed, invoking the Triple Gem and his own spiritual power from past and present lives, to calm the storm. Miraculously, the sea and winds immediately settled.
The fleet then continued safely and arrived at Chaiya. King Taksin anchored at Tha Phum Riang and stayed at a pavilion prepared by the vanguard army to bring auspiciousness to Chaiya. He then ordered the gathering of forces, assigning Phra Yommarat to lead the vanguard, while Chaophraya Chakri (Khak) and Phraya Phichai Racha were to join forces as the rear army and advance rapidly by land. King Taksin himself commanded the naval fleet to advance by sea, coordinating a simultaneous attack on Nakhon Si Thammarat from both land and water.
The land army under Phra Yommarat crossed at Tha Kham and reached Lamphun, attacking the enemy camp at Nakhon Si Thammarat, which was stationed at Tha Mak, defeating and dispersing them. They then established a camp at Khao Hua Chang.
At that time, the important city lord considered that the Thonburi army was attacking only by land and had not prepared for a naval battle. King Taksin’s naval force suddenly appeared at Pak Phaya, the estuary
At Nakhon Si Thammarat, on Thursday, the 6th waning day of the 10th lunar month, the city lord learned of the approaching forces and hastily gathered his people. He ordered Uparat Chan to set camp and prepare to defend at Tha Pho, which was Uparat Chan’s residence and the main river port leading into Nakhon Si Thammarat, about 30 sen from the city center.
King Taksin led his forces to attack and successfully captured the camp at Tha Pho, capturing Uparat Chan. The enemy troops fled back into the city in disarray. The city lord, fearing the king’s great power, abandoned any thought of resistance, fleeing the city with his relatives and kin down to Songkhla.
At that time, Nai Khong Phrai, commander of the royal guards, noticed the royal war elephant named Phlai Phet, which belonged to the city lord and was adorned with royal decorations. He captured the elephant and presented it to King Taksin. The king then mounted the elephant Phlai Phet and entered Nakhon Si Thammarat.
During the battle against Uparat Chan, only one royal officer, Nai Phet Thana Leuk, was killed by gunfire. The king’s forces captured the city lord’s daughters, relatives, consorts, many officials and servants, as well as Uparat Chan and all the nobles. They also seized a great amount of wealth and treasures.
Thus, King Taksin easily gained control of Nakhon Si Thammarat on the 6th waning day of the 10th lunar month.
The city lord escaped with his children, relatives, and possessions by boat to Songkhla, and then fled further to Thepha, a subordinate town of Songkhla.
Meanwhile, the land army under Chaophraya Chakri Khak advanced. Phra Yommarat’s vanguard attacked and took the enemy camp at Tha Makh, then moved on to meet the enemy’s fortified camp at Khao Hua Chang. However, before battle commenced, the enemy troops lost morale upon hearing that Nakhon Si Thammarat had fallen, and fled entirely.
Chaophraya Chakri (Khak) quickly led his troops to enter Nakhon Si Thammarat to consolidate the city. He feared being too late to follow the royal command that the land forces join with the navy to attack simultaneously. Nevertheless, the land forces arrived eight days later than the naval forces.
He reported his delay and asked for pardon. King Taksin forgave him but assigned Chaophraya Chakri (Khak) and Phraya Phichai Racha to lead combined land and naval forces to pursue and capture the fleeing city lord as a matter of restoring honor.
King Taksin himself then led the royal army from Nakhon Si Thammarat to pursue the city lord down to Songkhla on Friday, the 6th waxing day of the 11th lunar month.
Chaophraya Chakri (Khak) and Phraya Phichai Racha arrived in Songkhla and learned that Phra Phatlung and Luang Songkhla had escorted the city lord further south to Thepha, near the Malay border.
They inquired and found out the city lord had taken refuge with Phra Pattani Sri Sultan. Chaophraya Chakri (Khak) sent a formal letter to the Pattani ruler stating that the city lord was an enemy of King Taksin and ordered the Pattani ruler to apprehend and surrender the city lord and his followers. If the ruler refused, the Thai army would invade Pattani.
Fearing trouble from the Thai forces, the Pattani ruler complied by arresting the city lord, his son-in-law Chaophraya Phat, Chao Klang, Phra Phatlung, Luang Songkhla, and their followers, and sent them to the forces of Chaophraya Chakri.
Chakri (Khak) and his forces withdrew, returning to serve King Taksin at Songkhla. After King Taksin had successfully organized the administration of Songkhla and Phatthalung, he then returned to Nakhon Si Thammarat. Upon arrival, on Friday, the 12th waxing day of the 12th lunar month, the southwest monsoon had begun to blow along the southern coast, bringing strong winds and heavy rains. Because of the stormy weather, the king was unable to lead the army back to the capital and was compelled to remain in Nakhon Si Thammarat for the time being.
Note on the Campaign to Suppress the Rebellion of the Governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat by King Taksin
Suphat Sukonthapirom at Phatthalung (2538: 203-204) described the outcome of this campaign:
“…The fact that King Taksin was able to defeat the governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat without the necessity of a bloody battle that drenched the land in bloodshed, yet still achieved a complete victory, was due to His Majesty’s exceptionally high merit and charisma. This caused both the governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat and the Sultan of Pattani to fear and respect him greatly. Moreover, each of the king’s generals and commanders were renowned and highly skilled in military strategy and combat.
Most importantly, King Taksin possessed profound knowledge and understanding of methods to inspire and boost the morale of his soldiers, instilling in them confidence and determination that they would assuredly achieve victory under his leadership. The strategy of building morale and confidence among warriors was supported not only by these factors but also greatly influenced by sorcery, incantations, and sacred objects, which played a beneficial role in strengthening the courage and spirit of the troops.
Because of this, King Taksin achieved the most complete success, surpassing the results of wars fought by ruthless slaughter and bloodshed. This was a victory that brought the greatest benefit with the least loss.”
What is particularly interesting is the characters, yantra numerals, and various symbols inscribed on the Prachied cloth that King Taksin brought and distributed to his commanders, chiefs, and troops. Along with sprinkling sacred water obtained from Wat Pho in Chaiya — an ancient cultural center of the Srivijaya Kingdom in southern Siam since the 13th Buddhist century — these markings carried significant meanings. This is known as the “map on King Taksin’s Prachied cloth,” which reveals the arrangement of the Royal Army commanded by King Taksin himself as the Supreme Commander. Normally, the Royal Army was organized with a vanguard army led by its own general, and a rear army following behind, also led by a separate general.
Examining the detailed symbols and signs forming the patterns on this Prachied cloth indicates that the army was organized in the style of “Jaturongkasena” — a royal army formation popular during the reign of King Naresuan the Great (AD 1590–1600). This formation involved the famed elephant-mounted warriors of the Ayutthaya Kingdom.
The map on King Taksin’s Prachied cloth
(Image from Silpa Watthanatham Journal)
The map on King Taksin’s Prachied cloth and the Jaturongkasena army formation
(Image from Silpa Watthanatham Journal)
The term “จตุรงคเสนา” is a Sanskrit-derived word (from จตุร + องค + เสนา) meaning “army with four parts,” referring specifically to the four commanders assigned to guard each of the four elephant legs in battle, protecting the “war elephant” of the King or the Crown Prince engaged in the legendary elephant battle. Later, the Ayutthaya royal court adopted “เสนามีองค์สี่” as a noble military title for the king’s close officers. These ranks were divided into four hierarchical levels as follows:
- Infantry rank included:
1. Ai-In
2. Ai-Chan
3. Ai-Man
4. Ai-Khong - Section leader rank included:
1. Sergeant Res
2. Sergeant Rong
3. Sergeant Yong
4. Sergeant YotLieutenant rank included:
1. Nai Kuat
2. Nai Saneh
3. Nai Le A-Wut
4. Nai Suchinda (also known as Nai Sudjinda in some records) Captain rank included:
1. Luang Sak
2. Luang Sit
3. Luang Rit
4. Luang Det
Within the Chaturongkha Sena, the “Four Pillars of Command,” we can observe the placement of each individual on the cloth battle talisman (Pha Phrached) as follows:
1–2–3–4 = Luang Sak, Luang Sit, Luang Rit, Luang Det
5–6–7–8 = Sergeant Res, Sergeant Rong, Sergeant Yong, Sergeant Yot
9–10–11–12 = Nai Kuat, Nai Saneh, Nai Le A-Wut, Nai Suchinda
13–14–15–16 = Ai-In, Ai-Chan, Ai-Man, Ai-Khong
17 = “Shan Banner” – a ceremonial flag leading the royal procession and representing the vanguard
18 = “Striped Banner” – the flag following the procession, representing the rear guard
19–20 = Known as “Vajiraprakarn” or “Kamphaeng Phet” – guarding both flanks of the King
21 = The “Tiger in the Center”, symbolizing King Taksin the Great, born in the year Chulasakarat 1096, corresponding to Year of the Tiger, 2277 BE
It is noteworthy that within the center of the Vajiraprakarn flank (positions 19 and 20), on both the left and right sides, a line of script can clearly be seen—written in Arabic characters.
Upon consultation with learned masters and experts in talismanic cloths and Arabic script, a respected Dato’ explained that the Arabic inscriptions are in fact prayers glorifying God, as well as teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him). These were inscribed to invoke divine protection and military success.
During His Majesty’s time residing in Nakhon Si Thammarat, King Taksin personally carried out numerous royal duties, particularly regarding administration and religious matters. One recorded incident involves the royal command to extinguish a fire that had broken out within the city. Moreover, a royal edict was declared across the entire army forbidding all Thai and Chinese troops from slaughtering cattle or buffalo, and from harassing monks, Brahmins, or common citizens, thereby ensuring that no suffering or unrest befell the populace under his rule.
His Majesty, in His royal grace, ordered sacks of unhusked rice to be loaded onto Chinese junks and distributed as royal provisions to all civil and military officials. Upon discovering that many individuals with substantial wealth had been hoarding their assets, He authorized the opening of gambling houses, including Fantan, which was played in front of the royal audience and noted as being more spirited and enjoyable than any such games before. With deep religious reverence, His Majesty commanded the royal ecclesiastical officer to summon all monks, novices, and nuns throughout the city of Nakhon Si Thammarat to gather. To each monk, He offered a thang of rice and a baht in silver, as well as robes for those in need. On every Uposatha day, the poor and the destitute were given a salueng each as royal charity. His Majesty also ordered the construction of more than one hundred warships in preparation for future military campaigns. Furthermore, He generously commissioned both officials and townspeople to restore and renovate the ordination halls, sermon halls, viharas, cloisters, pavilions, and monk dwellings across numerous temples, expending a great portion of the royal treasury. To commemorate these pious deeds, a grand festival was held, with a ceremonial candlelit procession encircling the Great Mahathat Chedi for three full days.
The Great Stupa (Phra Maha That Chedi) in Nakhon Si Thammarat Province
(Image from sunsite.au.ac.th/…/Thailand76/South/nakornsri/ )
After the completion of the grand celebration of the Buddha’s relics, His Majesty commanded his ministers and officials to deliberate the punishment for the Governor of Nakhon. The ministers and officials unanimously agreed that the penalty was death. Upon hearing this, King Taksin graciously decreed, “I do not agree yet. The Governor is not yet our official servant. He has set himself above us, and we claim supremacy in return. That is why we came to battle. But if the Governor were to serve under us and then rebel, even if the ministers advise execution, I would agree. Fighting in battle cannot be counted as a crime.” When the Governor was captured, he humbly agreed to serve loyally and deserved to be brought to the capital for official service.
Thereafter, King Taksin graciously appointed his nephew, Prince Nara Suriyawong, to govern Nakhon Si Thammarat, with Phaya Rachasuphawadi and Phra Sri Klilas assigned to assist in governance. His Majesty also bestowed royal counsel to treat and support ministers, monks, Brahmins, and all citizens with justice and according to the ancient royal traditions. Finally, he appointed officials to oversee the administration of every district within Nakhon.
King Taksin of Thonburi, upon perceiving the utter devastation of Ayutthaya by the Burmese—including the destruction of the Tripitaka and classical literature—issued a royal decree to have the Tripitaka from Nakhon Si Thammarat transported by ship to the capital. After having every scripture meticulously copied, the originals were respectfully returned. In addition, the royal religious officer was ordered to invite Phra Acharn Si of Wat Phanan Choeng, who had fled the Burmese and taken refuge in Nakhon, to return to the capital together with his disciples, monks, and novices.
King Taksin remained in Nakhon Si Thammarat until the fourth lunar month of the Year of the Ox. Once the monsoon had ended, he ordered preparations for the return to Thonburi. The royal armada proceeded by water with divine grace and without encountering any misfortune.
As for the Ruler of Nakhon, once in Thonburi, he was granted a royal pardon and allowed to enter royal service. He was conferred the Water of Allegiance and bestowed a residence for a peaceful life. During his service in the capital, he distinguished himself in military campaigns against the Burmese. Furthermore, he presented his daughter, Mom Chim, to serve as a consort to King Taksin.
Upon the passing of Chao Nara Suriyawong, King Taksin, having complete trust in the Ruler of Nakhon, appointed him once again as governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat in 2319 BE. He was granted the golden royal charter as Phra Chao Nakhon Si Thammarat, Chao Khantasima, a title equating him with the rulers of vassal states. This title bestowed upon him the authority to appoint ministers across the four pillars of governance in Nakhon Si Thammarat.
Moreover, he was granted royal permission to maintain a female dance troupe, a rare privilege—previously reserved for the monarch alone. The troupe often performed in royal festivals in the Thonburi court, competing with the royal theatrical troupe. King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) later remarked that to celebrate the Emerald Buddha, the Ruler of Nakhon had to be summoned so that his performers could sail in the royal barge and perform at the ceremony. His troupe, clearly superior and likely not the Chatree style, retained its excellence because the city had not suffered devastation by the Burmese. Unlike the royal troupe, which had been reassembled postwar, the troupe of Nakhon remained intact and disciplined. (Thuan Boonyaniyom, 1970: 84–90)
10.3.2 Relations with Annam (modern-day Vietnam) during the Thonburi period can be divided into two distinct phases. In the first phase, Annam maintained a friendly stance toward Siam, hoping to gain support in resolving internal conflicts. This period was marked by cooperation and mutual benefit. However, in the later phase, tensions arose over Cambodia’s royal succession disputes. These conflicts led to strained relations between the two kingdoms, escalating to the brink of war toward the end of King Taksin’s reign.
In early 1769 (2312 BE), reports from Chanthaburi warned that Annamese naval forces had advanced into Banteay Meas, a Cambodian territory. Rumors spread that Annam might invade Thonburi. In response, King Taksin ordered the defense of the kingdom’s river mouths and appointed Phraya Pichai (Phraya Kosathibodi), a former Chinese officer, to lead the defense. However, it was soon confirmed that the Annamese forces were not targeting Siam. Their movement was related to a succession conflict in Cambodia between Nok Ong Non (Phra Ramraja) and Nok Ong Ton (Somdet Phra Narai Raja), who had sought Annamese military support. After his defeat, Nok Ong Non fled to Siam and pledged loyalty to King Taksin, requesting assistance.
King Taksin responded by sending troops to Cambodia, successfully restoring order and reasserting Siamese influence in the region.
Map showing the territory of present-day Vietnam
(Image from Silpa Wattanatham Journal)
Emperor Minh Mạng
(Image from the book Imperial Britain in South-East Asia)
In 1773 (B.E. 2316), the Tay-Son Rebellion erupted in southern Vietnam. Government forces were defeated by the rebel army. While the southern Vietnamese were preoccupied with suppressing the uprising, the Trịnh lords’ army from Tonkin took the opportunity to seize the city of Huế. The rebels eventually took control of Saigon, and many members of the Nguyễn dynasty were killed in battle.
Prince Chieu Chinh, a younger brother of the Viceroy of Hue, fled to seek refuge with Phraya Rachaseththi in Banteay Meas (in present-day Cambodia). Later, when the rebels attacked and captured Banteay Meas, Phraya Rachaseththi and Prince Chiêu Chinh took their families aboard ships and fled to seek shelter under the protection of King Taksin in Thonburi.
King Taksin graciously accepted them and provided housing. However, “Prince Chieu Chinh, despite receiving royal kindness and patronage, did not remain loyal. He secretly planned to escape and return to Vietnam. When King Taksin learned of this, he ordered the arrest of Prince Chieu Chinh, along with his wife, children, and more than 50 followers. All were executed.” (Royal Autograph Chronicle, published B.E. 2505 [1962], p. 411)
A descendant of the Nguyen dynasty who would later become significant to the affairs of Vietnam was Ong Chiang Sue, a nephew of Ong Chiang Chun. (In Vietnamese chronicles, he is referred to as Nguyen Anh.) At that time, he was only 15 years old and fled from the rebels to Pulo Panjang Island, with the aid of a French Catholic missionary named Pigneau de Behaine, who held the title of Bishop of Adran.
With support, Ong Chiang Sue managed to gather allies and launch a resistance against the Tay Son rebels, eventually reclaiming Saigon. The nobles of Saigon then proclaimed him as the ruler of the city—later known as King Gia Long of Vietnam. During this period, he also sent envoys to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Siam once again.
At that time, a rebellion broke out in the Khmer kingdom. The ruler of Champasak, Fa Talaha (Mu), rose in revolt against Phra Ramraja (Nak Ong Non or Non), the Khmer king whom Siam had appointed to the throne. Fa Talaha (Mu) then sought assistance from the Vietnamese. Among the Khmer royal lineage, the only one remaining was Nak Ong Eng, the son of Somdet Phra Narai Raja (Nak Ong Ton), who was still a child of four years old. He was officially the king of Cambodia, with Fa Talaha (Mu) acting as regent, and attempted to distance the kingdom from Siamese control.
In 1780 (B.E. 2323), King Taksin of Thonburi dispatched a military force to Cambodia, appointing Somdet Chao Phraya Maha Kasatsuek as the supreme commander, and ordering Somdet Phra Chao Luk Ya Ther, Prince Inthraphithak, to accompany the army. His Majesty commanded that, should the rebellion be subdued and order restored in Cambodia, Prince Inthraphithak was to be crowned as the new ruler of the Khmer capital.
The former imperial palace of the Emperor of Vietnam in Hue
(Image from Silpa Wattanatham Journal)
Note: The content in the Royal Chronicles here is a hypothesis by an archaeological scholar that the reason King Taksin sent Prince Krom Khun Inthraphithak to be crowned King of Cambodia may have been related to his consideration of succession in the Thonburi dynasty. At that time, there were two important princes: Prince Krom Khun Inthraphithak and Prince Suphanwong, also known as “Prince Men” (who later became Krom Khun Kasat Anuchit in the reign of Rama I). Although Prince Suphanwong was still young then, he was the grandson of King Buddha Yodfa Chulaloke. King Taksin was resigned to making Prince Suphanwong his heir, so he appointed Prince Krom Khun Inthraphithak to rule Cambodia to avoid rivalry over succession. Somdet Krom Phraya Damrong Rajanubhab considered this explanation somewhat suspicious and thus recorded it.
(Somdet Krom Phraya Damrong Rajanubhab, Royal Chronicles of Rattanakosin, Reign of Rama II, 1916: 75-76)
Prince Thalaha Mu fled with his family to Phnom Penh and humbly requested aid from the Vietnamese army stationed in Saigon. The Vietnamese sent troops to Phnom Penh. Chaophraya Surasi then led forces to follow Prince Thalaha Mu southward. Upon learning that the Vietnamese army was stationed in Phnom Penh, he quickly reported to Somdet Chaophraya Mahakasatsuek and set up camp awaiting orders from the supreme commander, but had not yet engaged in battle with the Vietnamese (Sethuon Suphasophon, 1970: 161-163). However, this military campaign to Cambodia was unsuccessful as a rebellion broke out in Thonburi, forcing Somdet Chaophraya Mahakasatsuek to withdraw his forces.
Meanwhile, in Saigon, the rebels recaptured the city from Nguyen Anh. Nguyen Anh raised an army of Khmer supporters to fight alongside him. Thalaha Mu also organized troops to assist but was defeated by the rebels. Nguyen Anh was forced to flee into the forests and islands near Cambodia until finally seeking refuge with the Thai monarch in Bangkok by late 1782. By 1785, the Tay Son had fully conquered southern Vietnam and by 1788 had taken control of all of Vietnam. The last king of the Hue (Le) dynasty fled to China and died there.
The turmoil and fragmentation of Vietnam created an opportunity for Siam to intervene fully in Cambodian affairs without fear of Vietnamese interference. This is reflected in King Rama I’s decision to bring Nak Ong Eng to Bangkok for protection and to appoint Chaophraya Aphai Phubet (Baen) as ruler of Cambodia (Mom Rajawongse Saeng Som Kasemsri and Wimon Pongpipat, 1980: 83-84).
10.3.3
Somdet Phra Chao Taksin restored Siam’s power over Cambodia.
Cambodia, a neighboring country, faced persistent political instability caused by ongoing conflicts within its ruling factions. Whenever disputes arose, Cambodia sought support from both Siam and Vietnam. Whenever Siam held stable power, Cambodia would accept tributary status under Siam. Toward the end of the Ayutthaya period, Cambodia remained a tributary state to Siam, but after Ayutthaya fell to Burma for the second time, Cambodia gained independence.
In 1769 (B.E. 2312), Somdet Phra Chao Thonburi sent a royal letter to King Narai Reamea Thipadei, the Cambodian monarch, reminding him to send tribute of silver and gold trees as was customary during Ayutthaya’s reign. However, the Cambodian king refused to acknowledge the authority of Somdet Phra Chao Thonburi, as recorded in the Cambodian royal chronicles, stating
Map showing the country of Cambodia (image from the book History of Cambodia)
“King Taksin is merely the son of a common Chinese family from Hai-Ng, who set himself up as king. For us to bring royal tribute of gold, silver, and flowers to pay homage as a vassal state—how could that be accepted?”
Because of this, in the year 2312 BE, King Taksin issued orders to organize two armies to invade Cambodia. He assigned Phraya Aphaironnarit (Thong Duang) and Phraya Anuchitracha (Bunma) to lead 2,000 troops via Nakhon Ratchasima, entering through Chong Samed to attack Siem Reap on one front. Meanwhile, Phraya Kosathibodi led another 2,000 troops via Prachinburi to attack Battambang on another front.
The Thai forces captured Battambang, Siem Reap, and Banteay Meanchey, but before they could seize the Cambodian capital, rumors arose that King Taksin had passed away at Nakhon Si Thammarat. Thus, the Thai armies withdrew.
The Khmer and Siamese Armies
(Image from History of Siamese Society and Culture, Thailand)
(Image from the book Somdet Phra Chao Taksin Maharaj)
Since the Thai armies withdrew from Battambang and Siem Reap at the beginning of the Year of the Tiger (2313 BE), King Narai of Cambodia understood that some event must have taken place in Siam and closely monitored the situation. When news came that the Burmese were advancing from the north, he expected Siam to be defeated again by Burma. Seeing this as an opportunity, he ordered Phra Sotthat, the Prince of Biam and a member of the Khmer royal family, to conscript men from the Putthaimat district to attack the Thai cities of Chanthaburi and Trat at the end of the Year of the Tiger (2313 BE). At that time, King Taksin had marched to attack Chiang Mai, and the forces from Chanthaburi successfully defeated the Khmer troops and forced them to retreat.
After King Taksin returned from Chiang Mai, displeased with the Khmer, he ordered the assembly of both land and naval forces (in 2314 BE). He appointed Chaophraya Chakri as commander of an army of 10,000 troops advancing via Prachinburi, accompanied by Nak Ong Non (or Non), the younger brother of the Khmer king who had taken refuge in Thonburi. The purpose was to persuade the Khmer factions to submit. The army attacked cities along the way. Chaophraya Chakri’s forces captured Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Prey Veng in sequence. When they neared Banteay Pich, King Narai realized he could not withstand the attack and abandoned the city, fleeing to Vietnam.
King Taksin personally led the royal naval forces, consisting of 200 warships, 100 sea vessels, and over 15,000 troops, appointing Phraya Kosathibodi as the vanguard. Upon reaching Banteay Meas on a Thursday, the 8th day of the 12th lunar month, he ordered diplomatic efforts to convince Phraya Rachasetthi, the lord of Banteay Meas, to surrender. When this failed, the city was attacked and taken on the 10th day of the 12th lunar month, though Phraya Rachasetthi escaped. After securing Banteay Meas, King Taksin’s forces proceeded via canal to Phnom Penh.
Living Conditions of the Khmer People
(Image from Siam Cyber Ed: Photo Library: Cambodia
http://www.cybered.co.th/library/combodia/level3.htm)
Note: One part of the history during this period suggests that King Taksin’s army stationed its troops at Wat Yothanimit (Wat Bot). To honor the former great monarch, the government elevated Wat Yothanimit’s status to a third-class royal temple of ordinary type since 1980 (B.E. 2523) and it remains so to this day. It is the only royal temple in Trat province. It is believed that the city of Trat used the temple’s old ordination hall (ubosot) as the site for officials to swear their oath of loyalty in the past, and the old ordination hall has been officially registered as a historical monument. (Source: Trat Province Book: 2192-2193)
The Thai army successfully captured the city of Banteay Meanchey. King Taksin then graciously appointed Nak Ong Non as the king of Cambodia, with the royal title Phra Ram Racha Thirat or Phra Ramathibodi. Meanwhile, Phra Narai Racha Thirat fled to seek refuge with the Vietnamese. However, at that time, political instability in Vietnam made it impossible for them to offer effective support. Seeking peace and stability for the region, Phra Narai Racha Thirat accepted a lower position as Maha Upayorach (Deputy King) and allowed his younger brother to become king in 1775 (B.E. 2318), as desired by Thailand. Consequently, Thailand regained influence over Cambodia, similar to the Ayutthaya period.
In 1780 (B.E. 2323), Cambodia experienced a rebellion with Phra Ram Racha (Nak Ong Non or Non) and Phra Narai Racha (Nak Ong Ton) fighting for the throne. Later, they reconciled, and King Taksin appointed Nak Ong Non (Phra Ram Racha) as the King of Cambodia, Nak Ong Ton as Maha Upayorach, and Nak Ong Tham as Maha Uparach (Deputy King). Subsequently, the Maha Uparach was assassinated, and the Maha Upayorach died shortly after from illness. The nobles suspected this was a plot by Phra Ram Racha and consequently drowned him. Cambodia was then ruled solely by Nak Ong Eng, the young son of Nak Ong Ton, who was only four years old. The regency was held by Fa Tala Ha Mu, who later aligned with the Vietnamese and refused to submit to Thai authority.
King Taksin therefore ordered Somdet Chaophraya Mahakasatsuek and Chaophraya Surasi to lead an army to suppress the rebellion. He also commanded the coronation of Somdet Chao Fa Krom Khun Intarapitak, his eldest son, as the King of Cambodia. Fa Tala Ha Mu sought Vietnamese assistance, with the Vietnamese army stationed in Phnom Penh. The Thai forces captured towns along the way, reaching Banteay Meanchey, the capital. However, when unrest broke out in Thonburi, Somdet Chaophraya Mahakasatsuek had to withdraw the army. (Source: Sanan Silakorn, 1988: 17-18)
10.3.4
Expansion of Power to the Kingdom of Laos
During the Thonburi period, the Kingdom of Laos was divided into three major city-states:
In the north was Luang Prabang (the Lan Xang Kingdom), ruled by Chao Suriyawongsa.
Next was Vientiane (Sri Sattanakhanakhut), ruled by King Siribunsan.
In the south was Champasak, ruled by Chao O (or Oh).
King Taksin expanded his power into the Lao kingdoms twice:
In 1775 (B.E. 2318), the ruler of Nang Rong city, which was a vassal of Nakhon Ratchasima, had a conflict with the ruler of Nakhon Ratchasima and defected to Champasak. Chao O accepted Nang Rong. King Taksin then ordered Chaophraya Chakri and Chaophraya Surasi to lead armies to attack Nang Rong and Champasak. The Thai army captured Champasak, Khong city, and Attapeu in 1776 (B.E. 2319).
As a result of this war, the Khmer forest cities — Talung, Surin, Sangkha, and Khukhan — also submitted to Thai rule. Thus, the southern Lao lands came completely under Thai influence.
Map of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
(Image from the book Laos)
2. Expansion of power into the Kingdom of Laos concerning Sri Sattanakhanakhut (Vientiane)
Before the Rattanakosin era, the area that is now Ubon Ratchathani province and nearby provinces already had scattered settlements. Most of the inhabitants were descendants of the Khmer or groups later known as the Kha, Suay, Kuy, and others. Around the 20th Buddhist century (roughly the 16th century CE), a struggle for the throne broke out in Sri Sattanakhanakhut (Vientiane). As a result, many villagers fled the war across the Mekong River to the west side and settled in areas now known as Roi Et province and surrounding regions, continuing down to the city of Champasak. They settled in groups in fertile areas, each group led by a respected leader who was recognized and accepted to govern and maintain peace, protecting people from attacks by Sri Sattanakhanakhut.
Later, in 1767 (B.E. 2310), while Ayutthaya was about to fall to the Burmese, another civil war for the throne occurred in Sri Sattanakhanakhut. This was because King Ong Lo, the ruler of Sri Sattanakhanakhut, died without an heir. Santhao Phaya, Nai Wo, and Nai Ta agreed to enthrone a prince (one of two descendants from a former king of Sri Sattanakhanakhut who had fled political persecution earlier) as King Siribunsan.
King Siribunsan appointed his younger brother as Uparaja (Deputy King) and appointed Nai Wo and Nai Ta as ministers with noble titles. However, Nai Wo and Nai Ta were disappointed for not being made Deputy King. Consequently, they led their families and followers across the Mekong River to the west, settling in Nong Bua Lamphu. There, they renovated the city, built strong fortifications, and renamed the city “Nakhon Khueankhan Khabkaeo Buaban” or sometimes called “Champaknak Khwang Khabkaeo Buaban” in some documents.
King Siribunsan learned about the construction of the new city by Phra Wo and Phra Ta and understood that their city-building was a preparation for war against him. He therefore sent Saen Thao Phaya to warn Phra Wo and Phra Ta, but they refused to listen. King Siribunsan then ordered his army to suppress them. Both sides fought for three years without either winning. Realizing their forces were inferior, Phra Wo and Phra Ta sent royal tribute and submitted to the Burmese, requesting military assistance. However, when the Burmese army, led by commander Mong La Nga, arrived, they sided with King Siribunsan and fought against Phra Wo and Phra Ta.
Despite Phra Wo, Phra Ta, and their troops’ determined resistance, they were eventually defeated due to fewer numbers. Phra Ta died in battle. Consequently, Phra Wo, along with Thao Kham Phong, Thao Faang Na, Thao Thit Phrom (Phra Ta’s son), and Thao Kam (Phra Wo’s son), fled south with their families and followers to the city of Nakhon Champasak. There, they received assistance from King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn, ruler of Nakhon Champasak, and settled in the Wiang Don Kong area, also known as Ban Du or Ban Kae in the Champasak district.
Later in 1771 (B.E. 2314 / J.S. 1133, year of the Rabbit), King Siribunsan learned that Phra Wo had resettled with his followers at Wiang Don Kong in Champasak. He sent Commander Akkharad with an army to suppress Phra Wo again. Upon learning this, King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn sent Phraya Phon Chiang Sai with troops from Nakhon Champasak to help Phra Wo resist King Siribunsan’s forces. At the same time, he sent a letter requesting clemency for Phra Wo. King Siribunsan replied that “Phra Wo is ungrateful and will not prosper if kept alive, but since the ruler of Nakhon Champasak has pleaded for mercy, he will pardon him to preserve friendship.” Consequently, King Siribunsan ordered Akkharad to withdraw his troops back to Sri Sattanakhanakhut (Vientiane).
At the end of 1771, Phra Wo had a conflict with King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn over the construction of a new city in Si Sumang subdistrict. Phra Wo then moved his family and followers to the Don Mod Daeng area (on the left bank of the Mun River, about 16 km east of the current Ubon Ratchathani provincial hall). He appointed Thao Phia to carry royal tribute to the ruler of Nakhon Ratchasima, requesting to become a vassal of the Kingdom of Siam to seek allies because of enemies surrounding him.
In the north, there was King Siribunsan of Sri Sattanakhanakhut (Vientiane), and in the south, King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn of Nakhon Champasak. Both kingdoms lacked strong enough military forces to defend themselves effectively against enemies when attacked. However, King Taksin (Somdet Phra Chao Taksin) did not take any action regarding this issue, probably because his forces were tied up fighting the Burmese, and also because the highland areas north of Nakhon Ratchasima belonged to Sri Sattanakhanakhut. King Siribunsan and King Taksin had previously made a treaty of friendship.
Later, in 1776 (B.E. 2319, J.S. 1138, year of the Monkey, Atthasak), King Siribunsan heard about quarrels between Phra Wo and King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn. Phra Wo led his family and followers to Don Mod Daeng. Siribunsan appointed Phraya Supho to lead an army to invade Phra Wo again. Seeing his forces were insufficient, Phra Wo fled back to Wiang Don Kong as before, requesting military aid from King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn of Nakhon Champasak. However, Ong Luang refused to help due to longstanding grievances.
As a result, Phra Wo’s forces were defeated, and Phra Wo was captured and executed at Wiang Don Kong. Thao Kham Phong, Thao Faang Na, Thao Thit Phrom (son of Phra Ta), and Thao Kam (son of Phra Wo) led their families and followers to escape the siege of Sri Sattanakhanakhut’s forces. They sent letters to Nakhon Ratchasima to report the situation and request military support from King Taksin. But the court in Thonburi took no action.
In 1778 (B.E. 2321, J.S. 1140, year of the Samritthiset), King Taksin ordered Somdet Phra Buddha Yodfa Chulalok Maharaj (then Somdet Chao Phraya Maha Kasatsuek) and Somdet Phra Bowon Ratchao Maha Surasinghanat (then Chao Phraya Surasi) to lead the army to suppress Phraya Supho at Wiang Don Kong, Champasak. When Phraya Supho learned of this, he quickly retreated to Sri Sattanakhanakhut. At the same time, King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn, fearing he couldn’t resist the Thai army, fled with his family to Ko Chai Island. Eventually, the Thai army captured Nakhon Champasak and arrested King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn.
The Thai forces then captured Nakhon Phanom, Nong Khai, and laid siege to Vientiane for nearly a year, finally taking it in late 1778. In this war, King Suriyavongsa of Luang Prabang came to assist in attacking Sri Sattanakhanakhut from the north. King Siribunsan fled to Muang Kham Kert. The Thai army placed Phraya Supho as governor of Vientiane and brought King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn, along with the Emerald Buddha and the Phra Bang statue from Vientiane, to Thonburi.
Not long after, King Taksin graciously allowed King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn to return to rule Nakhon Champasak. From then on, Nakhon Champasak became a tributary city of Siam.
Thao Kham Phong, son of Phra Ta, married Nang Tuy, daughter of the deputy king Thammatevo (brother of King Ong Luang Chai Kumarn). Thus, King Ong Luang and Thao Kham Phong became related by marriage. Because Thao Kham Phong commanded a large household and followers, he was appointed Phra Pratum Sura Ratcha Nayok (a high-ranking military commander) directly under Nakhon Champasak, based at Wiang Don Kong, from around 1779-1780 (B.E. 2322-2323) and remained there until the end of King Taksin’s reign.
According to Lao sources, Sri Sattanakhanakhut (Vientiane) and Lan Xang (Luang Prabang) became tributary states of Siam in 1778 (B.E. 2321).
Thus, it can be concluded that during the Thonburi period, Siam successfully expanded its influence into the three Lao kingdoms, and Laos became a vassal state of Siam until the end of King Taksin’s reign.
Note on the Emerald Buddha:
Judging from its Buddhist artistic style, the Emerald Buddha is believed to be the work of Northern Thai craftsmen, created following the Sri Lankan Buddhist style introduced when the Lanna Kingdom adopted Theravada Buddhism. The Emerald Buddha has historically been moved across many cities including Sri Lanka (modern-day), Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Luang Prabang, and Vientiane. Somdet Chao Phraya Maha Kasatsuek (later King Rama I of Rattanakosin) brought the Emerald Buddha from Vientiane to Thonburi. After ascending the throne, he built Wat Phra Sri Rattana Satsadaram (the Temple of the Emerald Buddha) and enshrined it on March 22, 1834 (B.E. 2377). He also created summer and rainy season costumes for the statue as religious offerings. Later, King Nangklao (Rama III) added the winter costume, completing the set for the three seasons.
Phra Bang is an important Buddha image, historically known and revered alongside the Emerald Buddha. It is widely respected and worshiped by Buddhists.
According to the legends of important Buddha images and the compiled chronicles volume 5, it is stated that in the year 418 of the Chulasakarat era (B.E. 1599), Phraya Sri Chularat, the ruler of Intapadthana city (Cambodia), sent royal envoys to request the Phra Bang from King Subinraj of Lanka. King Subinraj willingly granted the Phra Bang to the ruler of Intapadthana according to his wish, and ordered it to be brought and enshrined in the main vihara (temple hall) in the center of the city.
Wat Ho Phra Kaew (Image from the book Laos)
Later, Phraya Fang Num, the son-in-law of Phraya Sri Chularat, invited the Phra Bang to be enshrined in the city of Sri Sattanakhanut, Lan Xang Rom Khao (Luang Prabang). Upon arriving at the city of Vieng Kham, Phraya Vieng Kham requested to bring the Phra Bang to be enshrined there for worship, so the image came to reside in Vieng Kham.
Later, in the year 789 Chulasakarat (B.E. 1970), the ruler of Sri Sattanakhanut, Lan Xang Rom Khao, Phra Chai Chakrapat Phuanphaew, ordered the Phra Bang to be transported by boat from Vientiane. The boat sank at the rapids of Chan, south of Chiang Khan, and the Phra Bang was lost underwater. Shortly afterward, it was brought back and enshrined again in the vihara at Vientiane.
Then in the year 838 Chulasakarat (B.E. 2019), during the reign of Phaya Lan Nam Saen Thai Phuwanat, the Phra Bang was moved from Vieng Kham to be enshrined at Wat Chiang Klang in Sri Sattanakhanut, Lan Xang Rom Khao (Luang Prabang). He also ordered the construction of the vihara at Wat Manorom and had the Phra Bang enshrined there.
During the reign of Phaya Vichulratthabodi, around year 921 Chulasakarat (B.E. 2112), King Chaichetathiraj established a new capital city at Vientiane, naming it Chanthaburi Sri Sattanakhanut Lan Xang Rom Khao. The Phra Bang, Emerald Buddha, and Phra Saek Kham still remained at Wat Vichulrat Sattharam in the old city. Therefore, the city was renamed Muang Phra Bang Ratchathani Sri Sattanakhanut Lan Xang Rom Khao (City of Phra Bang, Royal Capital of Sri Sattanakhanut Lan Xang Rom Khao).
Later, in the year 1057 Chulasakarat (B.E. 2238), Thao Nong, who was the guardian of Luang Prabang, invited the Phra Bang, the Emerald Buddha, and Phra Saek Kham to flee the enemy and enshrine them in the royal city of Vientiane. During the reign of King Taksin of Thonburi, he ordered Somdet Chaophraya Mahakasatsuek to lead the army to capture Vientiane. The king also commanded that the Emerald Buddha and Phra Bang be brought to Thonburi.
The first monarch of the Rattanakosin Kingdom, King Rama I (Phra Buddha Yodfa Chulaloke), after building Wat Phra Sri Rattana Satsadaram (Wat Phra Kaew), ordered the Emerald Buddha and the Phra Bang to be enshrined in its ubosot (ordination hall). Later, Chao Nantasen, the son of the King of Lan Xang, petitioned not to have the Emerald Buddha and the Phra Bang enshrined together, claiming that their guardian spirits were hostile and that having both together would cause disasters and uprisings, as had happened in Luang Prabang and Vientiane.
King Rama I then decreed that although the Phra Bang was not as beautifully made as the Emerald Buddha, it was highly revered by the people of Sri Sattanakhanut (Lan Xang). Therefore, the Phra Bang was sent back to Vientiane.
During the reign of King Rama III (Phra Nang Klao), when the King of Vientiane (Chao Anouvong) rebelled and declared independence, Prince Bovorn Rachasena led troops to attack Vientiane. The people of Vientiane fled, taking the Phra Bang with them.
Later, Chao Phraya Bodindecha pursued Chao Anouvong and brought the Phra Bang, Phra Saek Kham, and Phra Chansamorn to Bangkok. King Rama III ordered these Buddhas to be enshrined in temples outside the royal city as follows:
Phra Saek Kham was enshrined at Wat Khrua Wat, Bangkok Thonburi.
Phra Chansamorn was enshrined at Wat Apson Sawan, Bangkok Thonburi.
Phra Bang was enshrined at Wat Chakrawat Ratchawat, Bangkok.
Later, during the reign of King Mongkut (Rama IV) in the year 2401 B.E., a comet appeared, followed by drought and a three-year plague. People interpreted these calamities as ominous signs. Concerned, King Mongkut ordered the Phra Bang to be returned from Wat Chakrawat Ratchawat back to Luang Prabang, and the royal naga (serpent) was enshrined in its place.
Map Showing the Malay Territories
(Image from the book “Geographical Maps: Lower and Upper Secondary Education”)
This Buddha image was once enshrined in the vihara (main hall) of Wat Chakrawat Ratchawat, located in Chakrawat Subdistrict, Samphanthawong District, Bangkok. However, during the reign of King Rama IV, it was graciously returned to Luang Prabang, the royal capital of Laos. Since then, this Buddha statue has remained enshrined in the vihara within the royal palace of Luang Prabang to this day.
10.3.5 Malay States
The Malay states have been tributary kingdoms (vassals) of Siam since the Sukhothai period. Important regions included Pattani, Terengganu, Perak, Kelantan, and Trengganu. Later, when Ayutthaya fell, these territories declared independence. During the reign of King Taksin, he intended to expand Siamese influence back into the Malay states. The Malay states that were tributaries of Siam during Ayutthaya’s time included Terengganu, Pattani, Kelantan, and Trengganu. After Siam lost Ayutthaya to the Burmese, these states declared independence. In King Taksin’s era, he did not send armies to subdue them but instructed the governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat to test the Sultan of Terengganu and Pattani by asking to borrow money to buy weapons, one thousand baht each. However, the sultans of these two cities refused the request. This is recorded in the Royal Chronicles of the Rattanakosin period as follows:
“…The ‘Hindu cities’ refer to the cities of Terengganu and Pattani, which had previously been under the rule of Ayutthaya but had not yet submitted. The governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat was instructed to consider borrowing money from these two cities—1,000 baht each—to purchase weapons, as a test of the loyalty of the Lord of Terengganu and the Lord of Pattani to see what they would do.”
There is no archival record indicating what the governor of Nakhon actually did. However, based on subsequent events, it is believed that the Lords of Terengganu and Pattani refused to lend the 1,000 baht. Whether their response was respectful or provocative is unknown, but it seems King Taksin was preoccupied with other wars. Terengganu and Pattani did not submit to King Taksin’s authority, and throughout his reign, he did not send armies to subdue them.
This evidence shows that King Taksin had the intention to expand his authority into the Malay states. However, due to the great distance, the difficulty, and the expense of sending armies, or because he had other more pressing duties, the Malay states remained independent from Siam until the end of his reign.
(Paradee Mahakhan, 1983: 28–29)
Summary:
King Taksin’s royal ambitions were fully realized during his reign of over 15 years. Records show that he commanded military campaigns 16 times during his reign. If we include the 14 campaigns he led before becoming king—as Phraya Wachiraprakarn defending Ayutthaya and breaking the Burmese siege to gather forces for the restoration—this totals 30 military campaigns. He personally led 23 of these, while appointing others as generals for 7 campaigns.
(Praphat Trinarong, Tribute to Important Figures, Vol.12, Office for National Identity Promotion, Office of the Prime Minister, 1991: 4)
10.4 What were the military tactics (in warfare) of King Taksin?
The tactics of King Taksin.
The history of King Taksin’s restoration of the nation showcases his unique military tactics, which are widely recognized and praised—even by military experts— for being exceptional beyond traditional methods. He also had brave and capable generals who were loyal and fought alongside him against the enemies. Because of this, shortly after the fall of the capital, he was able to decisively drive the Burmese out of the country and establish a new capital at Thonburi. Thailand thus regained full independence and sovereignty once again.
King Taksin was one of Thailand’s greatest warrior monarchs. He had an iron will and led by example, personally leading his troops into battle every time. He often commanded the royal army himself so he could closely observe the situation, give orders immediately, and boost his soldiers’ morale especially during tough times. He was quick and accurate in making decisions on the battlefield and possessed extraordinary endurance—both physically and mentally. Because of this, his officials and soldiers deeply respected, loved, and feared him.
The military tactics he used, which are widely praised, include:
Initiating the use of naval forces in warfare. Back then, naval combat wasn’t seriously practiced, but King Taksin was the first to lead a naval fleet into battle. For example, he led a naval assault from Chanthaburi to attack the Burmese at Pho Sam Ton camp. This victory paved the way for naval warfare in Thailand. In total, he led at least 30 battles, with 19 on land and 11 by sea and river.
In 1771 (B.E. 2314), he mobilized a fleet of 200 warships and 100 sea-going vessels with 15,000 troops from Thonburi, sailing to capture Kampong Som, Hatien (known as Phuttha Yaisam or Banthaimat in Thai, and Banteay Meas in Khmer), Phuttha Yai Phet, and even Phnom Penh. He returned victorious.
Changing battle plans from defending cities to proactive engagement. Instead of waiting behind city walls, he sent small detachments to intercept enemies far from the main forces, then followed with the bulk of his army to crush the enemy decisively.
Using artillery support effectively. He utilized cannons and coordinated attacks involving digging trenches and protective ditches for defense, alternating cannon fire with close-quarters combat using short weapons. This method was extremely effective.
Reorganized the army structure:
He abolished the old rear army and kept only the front army and the royal army, which included logistics and support units. The royal army in Thonburi’s time became the main fighting force and could be split into special task forces. For example, during the battle against the Burmese general Aza Wongki to defend Phitsanulok in 1775 (B.E. 2318), he deployed the royal army and the city guard as special task forces to protect key points like the Mae Sot checkpoint.
He also created a special artillery unit within the royal army to support battles—if one front was heavily attacked, this artillery would bombard enemy camps to clear the way.
He pioneered the use of defensive layered formations, stacking multiple lines deep during the defense of Phitsanulok, so even if the enemy broke the first line, they’d have to face more lines of resistance.Prioritized intelligence and communication:
King Taksin placed great importance on gathering and sending timely intelligence. Whenever he commanded battles, news from near and far flowed in continuously, enabling him to make fast and informed decisions on the battlefield.Organized support units effectively:
He set up support units like supply corps and transport units systematically, based on sound military principles. He tried to transport supplies from within the capital because food and provisions in the provinces were insufficient for recruitment.
He also preferred to transport troops through safer rear areas free from naval attacks, allowing larger and safer troop movements, saving energy and resources.
Because of these brilliant tactics, King Taksin’s forces won almost every battle against the Burmese. Even the Burmese general Aza Wongki, who attacked Phitsanulok in 1775, admitted: “The Thais are now very skilled fighters, unlike before. The loss of Phitsanulok wasn’t due to their fighting skills but due to hunger and lack of supplies. Future Burmese generals who think they can easily defeat Thailand should know that the Thai commanders are as capable or better than us. If they want to win against Thailand, they must be truly superior.”
10.5 How vast was the Kingdom of Thailand during the Thonburi period, and how different was it compared to the Ayutthaya period?
1. During the reign of King Taksin the Great, the Kingdom of Thailand expanded significantly beyond its former boundaries in the Ayutthaya period. After establishing Thonburi as the new capital, King Taksin led a series of successful military campaigns to reunify the country and secure its independence from Burmese control. His reign saw the reintegration of key provinces across central, eastern, and western regions of Siam. These included major cities such as Ayutthaya, Lop Buri, Nakhon Sawan, Prachin Buri, Rayong, Chanthaburi, Suphan Buri, and extended as far as Phetchaburi, Kanchanaburi, and Prachuap Khiri Khan. Through strategic warfare, strong leadership, and administrative reforms, King Taksin reestablished national unity and laid the foundation for the stability that would later flourish in the Rattanakosin era.
Map of Thailand during the Thonburi Period
(*Image from the book “สาระน่ารู้กรุงธนบุรี”)
Summary of the territorial extent of Thailand during the reign of King Taksin the Great:
To the north: Extended throughout Lan Na (the Kingdom of Lanna), reaching as far as Sipsong Panna and the Tai Yai (Shan States).
To the south: Included the territories of Saiburi, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Yatra (Johor). The Sultanate of Pattani also pledged allegiance and established friendly relations.
To the east: Reached across Cambodia, extending to southern Vietnam.
To the northeast: Covered Vientiane, Muang Phuan (also known as Phan), Luang Prabang, the regions known as the Five and Six Tai Districts, and the area of Sipsong Chuthai, bordering Hunnan in China.
To the southeast: Stretched to Banteay Meas (also known as Phutthaimat or Ha Tien), located beyond the province of Trat.
To the west: Reached Myeik (Mergui) and Tanintharyi (Tavoy), extending to the Indian Ocean.
(Source: Thai Territories, Bangkok: Arun Kanphim, n.d.: 42; and The Restoration of the Kingdom by King Taksin the Great, The Foundation for the Preservation of Monuments in the Old Palace, 2000: 107–109)
2. Territorial Boundaries of Thailand during the Reign of King Taksin the Great
To the north, the realm extended across the Kingdom of Lanna, reaching as far as Sipsongpanna and the territories of the Tai Yai.
To the south, it encompassed the regions of Saiburi, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu, and the city of Yatra. The Sultanate of Pattani also entered into a friendly alliance.
To the east, the territory stretched across Cambodia and bordered the southern regions of Vietnam.
To the northeast, the kingdom claimed dominion over Vientiane, Muang Phuan (also known as Phan), Luang Prabang, the Five and Six Tai Districts, and Sipsong Chuthai, reaching as far as Hunnan, a frontier of China.
To the southeast, it extended to Banteay Meas (also known as Phutthaimat or Ha Tien), beyond the region of Trat.
To the west, the boundary reached Myeik (Mergui), Tanintharyi (Tavoy), and touched the shores of the Indian Ocean.
(Thai Territories, Bangkok: Arun Kanphim, n.d.: 42; The Restoration of the Kingdom by King Taksin the Great, Foundation for the Preservation of Monuments in the Old Palace, 2000: 107–109)
