King Taksin the Great

Chapter 5: Events Following the Fall of Ayutthaya to the Burmese

5.1 When did Ayutthaya fall to the Burmese?

On Tuesday, the ninth day of the waxing moon in the fifth month of the Year of the Pig (Chulasakarat 1129), corresponding to 7 April 1767, the Burmese burned the base of the city wall at Hua Ro near the Mahachai Fort and fired cannon into Ayutthaya from all surrounding camps. By dusk the wall collapsed, and at eight in the evening the Burmese signaled a full assault. They climbed in first where the wall had fallen, and despite the remaining Thai defenders’ resistance, the Burmese entered the capital on every front that night, ending a siege that had lasted one year and two months. (Janya Prachitromran, 1993: 169)

The Burmese chronicles state that the city was breached at about four in the morning on Thursday, the eleventh day of the waxing moon in April 1767, Year 1129 of the Burmese Era. (Sunet Chutintranond, 1998: 68) The three-day discrepancy between Thai and Burmese sources may stem from differences in defining when the city was considered taken or from recording errors. (Athorn Jantawimon, 2003: 229)

According to The Testimony of the Inhabitants of the Old Capital, page 174, a traitor named Phraya Phon Thep supplied the Burmese with arms and provisions and promised to open an eastern gate, likely near Hua Ro. The Burmese attacked through this point at night as arranged. The date given in this account matches the previously noted date of the city’s fall, based on what Thai captives witnessed.

Several chronicles state that the Thais fought fiercely as the city neared collapse, repeatedly forcing the Burmese back until the siege became static. When Ayutthaya finally fell, Thai defenders died on the ramparts and throughout the city, and they would have clearly seen the actions of Phraya Phon Thep. His fate after the fall remains unknown. (Janya Prachitromran, 1993: 171)

5.2 After Ayutthaya had fallen to the Burmese, how did the Burmese deal with the Thai people?

When the Burmese entered the capital, it was during the night (the Burmese chronicles state it was around four in the morning; Sunet Chutintranond, 1998: 68). Wherever they advanced, they set fire to the houses of the inhabitants, the flames spreading as far as the royal palace. The blaze lit the city as though it were daytime. Seeing no resistance, the Burmese plundered and gathered valuables and seized people in chaos throughout the capital, but because it was a time…

The chronicles record that in Chulasakarat 1129, the Year of the Pig, Nopasok, on Tuesday, the ninth day of the waxing moon in the fifth month, the New Year’s Songkran day, the Burmese set fire to the base of the city wall at Hua Ro beside the Mahachai Fort. By eight in the evening they fired a signal flare, and the Burmese troops on all sides, already prepared, placed ladders against the collapsed section of the wall and other points around the capital and climbed into the city at that hour. They then set fires throughout the city, burning houses, monasteries, and the royal palace precincts.

During the night many inhabitants managed to flee, but the Burmese captured about 30,000 people, including Phra Chao Uthumphon, who had taken ordination, together with princes, high and low officials, and monks and novices who could not escape; these prisoners were gathered and held at the Pho Sam Ton camp. The civilians taken were distributed among the various commanders’ camps. The Burmese then went about seizing valuables—both royal and private property, together with the gold and silver and sacred objects from large and small monasteries—taking whatever they could find without regard for whether it should be taken. They even dug up treasures that residents had hidden in temples and houses. Those captured were interrogated, pitted against one another, and enticed to reveal others’ hidden wealth; anyone who named another’s hoard was often released, while the original owner, if unwilling to disclose it, was beaten and subjected to other punishments, and in some cases pressed until death to force the recovery of property.

The condition of civilians fleeing the ravages of war (courtesy of Muang Boran)

The fall of Ayutthaya on this occasion was a profound national catastrophe. The Burmese put countless people to death and destroyed or carried off vast amounts of property, searching every place with the intention that the Thais should be left with nothing. Even the splendid monasteries revered in Buddhism—shared by both nations—were burned. The Burmese also kindled fires beneath the great standing Buddha image Phra Si Sanphetdayan (a cast-gold figure weighing 53,000 chang, or 44,166.66 kilograms), which stood in the central vihara of Wat Phra Si Sanphet, to melt the gold casing and take the 286 chang (238.33 kilograms) of gold for use in Burma. They likewise drove off the population to serve as captives and slaves, and continued burning houses and destroying property for fifteen days. (Thuan Bunyaniyom, 1970: 48–50)

“…At that time the King of Ayutthaya, together with the queen, the royal children, and members of the royal family, fled in all directions. Royal attendants took the king by boat and hid him in the thickets near Ban Chik beside Wat Sangharam, unknown to the Burmese. After eleven or twelve days he passed away. The Burmese later captured the queen, the royal children, and the royal family and brought them to the Pho Sam Ton camp as well…” (Testimony of the Inhabitants of the Old Capital, Testimony of Khun Luang Ha Wat, and the Royal Chronicles of the Old Capital, Luang Prasoet Aksoraniti edition, 1972: 437–438) (See details in Chapter 2)

Burmese soldiers set fire to and heated the standing Buddha image Phra Si Sanphetdayan to melt its gold casing and take the 286 chang of gold for use in Burma (courtesy of Muang Boran)

Not only Thai sources describe the destruction of the capital and the killing of its inhabitants by the Burmese during the second fall of Ayutthaya; foreign records and correspondence likewise speak of the invaders’ conduct in similar terms. According to accounts by Anthony Goyaton, an Armenian who had once been head of the foreign Europeans in Siam, and by Hajji Seyed Ali, a Muslim cleric who had lived in Ayutthaya, addressed to the Dutch harbour master P. van der Voort, the Burmese “devastated Ayutthaya completely … and killed great numbers of people as they fled the fires, dividing the survivors into groups and driving them off to Burma after setting fire to and destroying the Company’s warehouse.” (Dutch-language record, in Historical and Archaeological Documents, vol. 2, no. 2, 1968: 23)

The Testimony of Anthony Goyaton (Palembang, 1768)
Anthony Goyaton was an Armenian and had been Head of the Foreign Europeans in Ayutthaya, living there together with the Moslem priest Seyed Ali.

He recorded, in his own handwriting, an official account of the final day of Ayutthaya as witnessed by him. The document is about two pages long and was certified by the Dutch shabandar (harbour master), P. van der Voort, on 26 April 1768.

The credibility of Goyaton’s testimony rests on his position as Head of the Foreign Europeans in Ayutthaya and on the fact that harbour master P. van der Voort officially recorded it for the Dutch East India Company, for whom accuracy in such testimony was essential. His statement provided formal confirmation that the Company’s major warehouse and facilities in Ayutthaya had been entirely destroyed in 1767 and were never rebuilt.

The following is the testimony given by Anthony as officially recorded.

The testimony of an eyewitness
(This testimony is an official record by those who witnessed the destruction of Ayutthaya in 1767)

Anthony Goyaton, an Armenian and former Head of the Foreign Europeans in Siam, together with the Arabian priest Seyed Ali, who had once resided in Siam, related the following account to Shabandar P. van der Voort:

“… After the Company’s servants had departed in November 1765, it was not long before the Burmese besieged Siam in July or August 1766, after having already destroyed the surrounding towns. They set up small artillery positions around the capital to prevent anyone from entering or leaving.

This situation continued until March 1767, when the waters rose and flooded the area around the capital. The Burmese then approached the city at night in many boats, placed ladders against the walls in several places, and hurled clay pots filled with gunpowder inside the besieged walls. Once they had taken the capital, they jointly reduced the city to ashes. In this operation they were greatly assisted by their compatriots within the city—about five hundred of them, previously captured by the Siamese—and by Burmese forces already inside who could communicate with those outside. The account continues that after killing most of the people who fled in confusion, the Burmese divided the remaining survivors into groups and led them away, after setting fire to the Lodge of the Company.”

As for the young king (King Uthumphon), together with the royal family and Berquelang, they were among those taken away. Along the way, the young king fell ill and died, and Berquelang took poison and died as well. The testimony further states that the elder king (King Ekkathat) was secretly killed on the same night by fellow Siamese.

The eyewitness, together with companions numbering about one thousand—Portuguese, Armenians, Mons, Siamese, and Malays, men, women, and children—were marched toward Pegu under the guard of only fifteen Burmese. Midway through the journey they found the opportunity to overpower their captors and escape. After struggling through forests and wilderness, they eventually reached the Siam River once more.

The witness stayed there for three months, and later he and his companions from the Company boarded a small Chinese boat and traveled to Cambodia, then continued on to Palembang, finally arriving here on the twenty-third of this month on a vessel of Juraogan Inc.

He further stated that after the Burmese had withdrawn from the country, some Siamese resettled at Bangkok, where the French Lodge had once stood, and made their livelihood by trading with Cambodia. At the same time, about two thousand Chinese, under the leadership of one of their chiefs, remained living at the river mouth, continuing their farming and fishing as before.

Testimony given on 26 April 1768…”

Considerations

1. Shabander or Shabandar is a Persian term originally meaning “King of Heaven.” His duties were, first, to look after the merchants of the nation he represented in particular. At the same time, the market and warehouses were under his administration. He was responsible for inspecting weights, measures, and coins, as well as adjudicating disputes between ship captains and the merchants of the ships belonging to the nation he represented.
2. When the Company’s servants departed in November 1765, the Burmese army was carrying out its second phase of operations. When the Burmese besieged the capital in July or August 1766, the Burmese forces were carrying out the third phase.
3. In March, the water level in the rivers surrounding Ayutthaya typically receded; the testimony does not specify the exact date.
4. The date on which the Burmese entered the capital, according to the testimony, is given only as a day in March, without specifying exactly which day. However, verified evidence shows that the Burmese seized the city on 7 April 1767.
5. The “young king” likely refers to King Uthumphon, and the “elder king” likely refers to King Ekkathat. The accounts of their deaths in the testimony differ from the established evidence.
6. The “Siam River” refers to the Chao Phraya River.
7. According to discovered evidence, a Thai traitor named Phraya Phon Thep opened the city gate; however, the testimony states that Burmese inside the city also assisted. This may represent separate actions, a coordinated effort, or the same incident remembered differently.
8. The French Lodge was located in Thonburi. (Janya Prachitromran, 1993: 196–199)

In the records of the French Mission, Mgr. Brigot wrote to the Director of the Paris Foreign Missions that after the Burmese had taken the capital, they set fire to houses and destroyed property for fifteen days, killing people indiscriminately, whether wealthy or poor. The Burmese made particular efforts to kill monks and slew them in countless numbers; he himself saw more than twenty monks killed by the Burmese in a single morning. (National Library Chronicle Compilation, vol. 9, Bangkok: Kaona, 1965: 420)

M. Turpin, in his History of the Kingdom of Siam (translated by S. Sivaraksa in Social Science Review, vol. 4, no. 4, 1967: 57), described the conditions after the fall and the Burmese frenzy, stating that the capital was taken, and the treasures of the palace and the monasteries were reduced to ruins and ashes. The barbarous victors, angered further by their failure to obtain the wealth they coveted, vented their fury on the townspeople with extreme cruelty, even searing the soles of their feet with fire.

Burmese soldiers committing acts of abduction and assault
(courtesy of Muang Boran)

Burmese soldiers looting and killing without restraint
(courtesy of Muang Boran)

The Burmese applied torture to force people to reveal the hiding places of their valuables, and even dragged out their daughters to be raped before their fathers’ eyes. Monks were accused of concealing great treasures and were shot full of arrows or thrust through with spears, many being beaten to death with wooden clubs. Monasteries and surrounding areas were strewn with corpses, and the rivers and canals were likewise filled with floating bodies, emitting a stench so overpowering that it was difficult to breathe. Swarms of flies gathered in great numbers, causing severe annoyance to the Burmese troops encamped there…

… After the Burmese had taken Ayutthaya, they remained for about nine or ten days (the Burmese burned the city for nine days and nine nights; Athorn Jantawimon, 2003: 229). When they had gathered enough captives and valuables, they withdrew, driving off people, elephants, horses, jewels, silver and gold, and taking Khun Luang Ha Wat (King Uthumphon) with them. Nemyo Sithu, the Burmese commander-in-chief, appointed Suki Mon—the officer credited with breaking the Bang Rachan fortifications—as commander, with Mongya Burma as his deputy, over 3,000 Burmese and Mon troops stationed at Pho Sam Ton to continue seizing people and collecting goods. He appointed Nai Thong-In (or Boonsong), a Thai who had sided with the Burmese, as governor of Thonburi. The Burmese army was then divided into three forces. The northern force, under Nemyo Sithu, escorted high-ranking captives and valuable treasures through the Mae Lamao Pass in Tak. The southern force, commanded by the governor of Bagan, transported heavy goods by boat through Thonburi, the Tha Chin River, and Mae Klong. Another force marched overland through Suphanburi to join the fleet at Kanchanaburi, returning together through the Three Pagodas Pass…

At that time the Burmese seized 1,200 cannons, tens of thousands of small firearms, and also obtained a pair of bronze twin-barrel guns twelve cubits long, together with four royal barges (Athorn Jantawimon, 2003: 230). As for the massive Phra Phirun Saen Han cannon, when the fall of the capital became inevitable, it was thrown into the Crystal Pool within the old royal palace. When the Burmese learned of this, they retrieved it, and the southern commander Pakan Wun had it transported by boat toward Kanchanaburi to join the land forces there. But upon reaching Talat Kaew in Nonthaburi, they found the cannon far too heavy to be taken to Ava.

Pakan Wun therefore had the great cannon hauled ashore at Wat Khema and packed it full of gunpowder, setting it alight to destroy it. Even this did not satisfy him, and the Burmese carried the remaining bronze pieces back to Ava. (The Burmese army left Ayutthaya on 6 June 1767, about two months after the city had been taken; Khachorn Sukpanich, 2002: 270)

The Burmese secured more than 30,000 Thai captives and divided them into two groups:
– The first group consisted of King Uthumphon, members of the royal family, and nobles, whom Nemyo Sithu sent northward under the northern army.
– The second group, made up of remaining civilians and missionaries, was placed under Pakan Wun, commander of the southern forces, who transported them by land and water southward toward Tavoy, where they later joined the first group north of Ava.

Note
Elders of earlier generations recounted that the Burmese captured so many Thai prisoners that chains and shackles were insufficient. They therefore pierced the tendon above the heel and threaded rattan through it to link the prisoners together for the long march to Ava, Burma. Since then, Thai people have called this tendon the “rot wai” (the rattan-threaded tendon). (Wiset Chaiyasri, 1998: 305)

The Thai captives taken away at that time established settlements at Pong Letai (Tuk Pong Le), near the Chaweta Chaung or Golden Canal, in the Ra Heng Mongtis or Raheng market area, about thirteen kilometers from Mandalay. Their community centered on Wat Rahai, had a market known as Yodia Market, and preserved classical Yodia dance forms such as the Four-Faced Brahma dance, which survive in Burma today.

King Uthumphon was forced by King Hsinbyushin, a ruler obsessed with warfare, to leave the monkhood and reside at Sagaing (Skeng) opposite the city of Ava, together with most of the Thai princes and officials. The Burmese questioned them about the chronicles and court traditions of Ayutthaya and recorded the information, which later became the materials known in Thailand as the Testimony of Khun Luang Ha Wat or the Testimony of the People of the Old Capital. As for the commoners taken as captives, the Burmese dispersed them to various places; some eventually escaped and returned, though most vanished into Burmese society.King Uthumphon never returned to Siam. The last trace of him is his stupa in Sagaing. The Glass Palace Chronicle records about the royal captives taken to Ava after the war: “The royal women of the Ayutthaya court—queens, elder and younger royal sisters, princesses, granddaughters, and nieces—were placed within the royal precinct, each attended according to rank. Princes and other male royals were housed outside the palace but were still provided proper care. The nobles and commoners of Ayutthaya were also granted dwelling places. Among the royal captives was a prince called ‘Chao Fa Dok Duea’ (Kyauk-bwa Tauk-to), the former name of King Uthumphon, who had been in the monkhood when taken to Ava. He remained in saffron robes until his death in 1796, after the capital had moved from Ava to Amarapura.” (Sunet Chutintranond, 1998: 112)

Ayutthaya, ruled by thirty-three monarchs and the capital of the Siamese kingdom for 417 years, finally met its destruction in this calamity. (Janya Prachitromran, 1993: 185–186)

5.3 Why did the Burmese hastily withdraw their forces back to Ava, the Burmese capital?

The reason the Burmese hastily withdrew to Ava was that Nemyo Sithu had been ordered to return because the Burmese king was being threatened by a Chinese army invading the frontier towns. The Burmese forces retreated rapidly and reached Ava in July 1767. The Glass Palace Chronicle continues that in the two to three years following the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767, Chinese armies repeatedly invaded Burmese territory, forcing the Burmese to focus their efforts on repelling these incursions. The cause of the conflict stemmed from misunderstandings between Chinese merchants and Burmese officials in the frontier regions between China and Burma.

The Glass Palace Chronicle records that the Chinese invaded Burma four times, but were defeated on each occasion. This prevented King Hsinbyushin (King Mangra) from personally leading an army to attack Siam, even though he was aware of efforts in Siam to establish a new dynasty and overthrow Burmese control. Notably, this account aligns with events in Thonburi, where King Taksin the Great restored Thai independence within seven months and moved the capital from Ayutthaya to Thonburi in 1767. (Rong Sayamanon, in Historical and Archaeological Documents, vol. 18, no. 1, January–December 1984: 39–46)

When Nemyo Sithu returned to Burma, King Mangra appointed him “Sri Ayudhya Wun.” Yet, as retribution for the harm the Burmese had inflicted upon the Thai kingdom, it is recorded that in the same year a great earthquake struck throughout Burma, causing many pagodas and important structures to collapse. Alarmed by this, King Mangra ordered several gold Buddha images to be cast as acts of merit and placed them within the stupas that he restored. (http://www.worldbuddhism.net/buddhism-history/Burma.html, 14/7/2004)

Consideration 1
This war was long and protracted (1764–1767), owing to the fact that the Burmese forces carried out their operations continuously.

1. Purpose — Throughout, the Burmese maintained a single objective: to plunder wealth like bandits rather than act as a conventional army. Perhaps for this reason King Mangra of Burma did not dare join the campaign personally, fearing the loss of royal dignity by participating in a force behaving as thieves; instead he allowed his commanders to lead the army as marauders.
2. Target — Driven by greed for riches, their original limited aim of taking whatever they could was replaced by a more ambitious objective: to seize Ayutthaya itself. Because prior raids had proved profitable and easy, they resolved to take the capital. This shift required extended preparation and prolonged operations over greater distances and time.
3. The Burmese continuously contemplated invading Siam — this appears to be true, for their actions show a consistently aggressive posture.
– The Burmese sought to subdue neighboring states in order to assert dominance.
– Conquering any state would not equal the prestige of conquering Siam; if Siam were subdued, other states would fear Burma.
– Thus the intention to invade and subdue Siam remained continually in the background.

4. The Burmese chronicles affirm that King Mangra ordered Nemyo Sithu and Mang Maha Noratha to lead their armies to attack Ayutthaya. Upon consideration, this seems plausible; without such an order, the two commanders would not have dared act. The question, however, lies in when the order was given. If it was issued before March 1764, it is likely true; if given later, it may simply have aligned with circumstances that became favorable. Judging from the situation, both the terrain and timing support this view. The missionaries claimed that the Thai forces were ineffective, whereas the Burmese insisted that the Thai forces were highly capable. The truth depends on the standard of comparison: the missionaries likely used European standards, while the Burmese judged by Asian standards.
5. In Phase Four, the Burmese advanced close to the city walls. History records only the battles around Ayutthaya, but does not explain what became of the forces stationed at Phitsanulok in the northern region, at Nakhon Ratchasima in the northeast, at Prachinburi in the east, along the coastline, at Phetchaburi, or surrounding areas—which should have already regrouped by then—as well as the forces at Nakhon Si Thammarat and the naval units. These forces still had the potential to aid Ayutthaya, yet history records no such assistance. It is almost as if they were waiting for Ayutthaya to fall so that they might rise to power themselves. Had each area sent even a single unit to assist, the situation might have reversed: the Thais could have encircled the Burmese as the outer force, similar to the war of 1548, when Tabinshwehti withdrew immediately upon hearing that another Thai army was approaching. But this time the external forces contributed nothing to the strategic defense.
6. As for the use of artillery, the Thais had the advantage of fixed positions and large long-range cannons, likely in considerable numbers since they did not need to be transported far. Yet this advantage was lost due to restrictions imposed for the sake of preserving the peace of mind of a few easily frightened women (Mom Pheng, Mom Man, and the palace ladies). The king (King Ekkathat) valued their comfort more than the survival of the nation, which may explain why the capital fell.
7. In the first war, King Ekkathat asked King Uthumphon to leave the monkhood to defend the realm. But this time he did not summon him. Perhaps in the earlier conflict the king did not know how to proceed and had relied on Uthumphon as an example—an effort that successfully saved the city. By the time of the second war, he may have believed he could lead the defense himself, having observed the previous campaign, and saw no need to depend on Uthumphon. Thus Uthumphon was not invited to leave the monkhood, and he did not leave it of his own accord. As a result, the capital fell.
8. The chronicles describe events during the fall consistently, but according to the Testimony of the People of the Old Capital, the case of Phraya Phon Thep appears—an act of treason by a Thai against his own people. Those giving testimony were combatants on the scene, so the absolute truth remains uncertain and warrants further investigation.
9. The Burmese chronicles do not mention the assaults on the defensive camps that Ayutthaya had established around the capital, but Thai sources and others confirm that the Burmese suffered losses in both manpower and time in capturing these positions. They spent nine nights taking the camp at Wat Chaiwatthanaram and another fifteen nights taking the Chinese camp at Khlong Suan Phlu.

– The camps north and northeast of the capital, located in vulnerable areas, fell around February or slightly earlier.
– The camps south of the capital were taken around the latter half of March.
– The camps to the west likely fell shortly before those to the south.

10. The Burmese chronicles further state that after the army of Phra Maha Montri was defeated and retreated into the city, the King of Ayutthaya ordered the sacred cannon named Dvaravati (called Phra Prab Hongsa in the Ayutthaya chronicles), a revered ancient guardian cannon believed to house a protective deity, to be brought out for public ritual offerings and then mounted on the Mahachai Fort (Wat Si Pho, Athorn Jantawimon, 2003: 229) to fire at Nemyo Sithu’s camp for auspicious effect. The gunpowder failed to ignite because moisture had seeped through cracks in its aged barrel; the cannon was not a standard operational gun and had long lacked maintenance, so malfunctions were likely. Meanwhile, Phraya Srisuriyapha fired the great cannon Mahakal Mritayuraj from Taikop Fort at the Burmese on Golden Mount, but it cracked after a single shot and became unusable. (Athorn Jantawimon, 2003: 229)
11. The Burmese chronicles also describe the severe famine in Ayutthaya, where rice had to be rationed at one thanan (one liter) for twenty people. Many citizens surrendered to the Burmese, confirming that starvation was their primary method of forcing capitulation.
12. The Burmese chronicles continue that once they breached the city, they immediately set fire to houses and spread out to plunder as they pleased. (Janya Prachitromran, 1993: 186–190)

Consideration 2
The Thai defeat in the war that led to the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767 had direct consequences for political and military strategy in at least two significant respects.

The first was that later Thai rulers recognized the need to extend the kingdom’s political influence firmly and continuously over Lanna, Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champasak, in order to prevent the Burmese from using these territories as staging grounds for attacks on the capital, as Nemyo Sithu had successfully done in the war of 1767.
The second was that Thai rulers were compelled to revise their strategic defense against Burma, abandoning the ineffective practice of relying on the capital itself as the primary defensive base, and instead using key frontier towns along invasion routes as the main lines of defense. In practice, the commanding general—either the king himself or the Front Palace—would lead the main army out of the capital to confront the Burmese in these provincial strongholds. Prince Damrong observed that this was “an unprecedented development in Thai history.” (Sunet Chutintranond, 2000: 191)

Consideration 3

1. In the first fall of the capital in 1569, before returning to Burma, the Burmese installed a royal prince to govern the kingdom (King Maha Thammaracha). In any conflict, the victorious side typically appointed a local ruler or someone native to the city to govern, or else placed its own commanders in charge, making the conquered city or state a vassal. This generally ensured an orderly system of administration, allowing the people to work, live in peace, and prosper. But in the second fall of 1767, the Burmese did not follow this model as other nations did; they sought only to destroy the capital completely and seize whatever benefit they could.

2. The task assigned by the Burmese to Commander Suki and Nai Thong-In was to search for remaining inhabitants and to seek out any valuables still left behind and send them to Burma.
From these two points, it is evident that…

– 2.1 Their treatment of their opponents and their brutal abuse of those already defeated—marked by crude, savage, and dishonorable conduct—was unbefitting of a nation that claimed to be a devout Buddhist state. They behaved in this manner toward another Buddhist kingdom, showing no respect for the vanquished.
– 2.2 Their actions reveal an intention to prevent the Thai kingdom from ever rising again as a rival power in the Southeast Asian region. Even if such suppression could last only a short time, it nevertheless fulfilled King Mangra’s desire to keep Siam subdued for a period.
– 2.3 Their conduct was that of bandits rather than that of an honorable army. After destroying the capital and ravaging it completely, their insatiable greed led them to establish two proxy authorities—essentially offices to secure Burmese interests—to continue extracting wealth and sending it to Burma. This was done through coercion and intimidation, not through formal indemnities negotiated between governments as practiced elsewhere. Many of the items taken in this manner remain on display in Burma to this day.

3. As the saying goes, the events of the past (the first fall of the capital) were returning once again: the Burmese enemy was at the city gates, the Thai people were divided, and the fall of the capital seemed inevitable. Now the events of the past had fully repeated themselves—the capital had indeed fallen, matching every aspect of what had happened before. It was a recurrence of history, a second fall that should never have happened. (Janya Prachitromran, 1993: 185–186)

Note
Suki Phraya Naikong, also known as Nai Thong Suk—the name “Suki” found in the chronicles is understood to be a Thai corruption of the Burmese word Sukkye, meaning “commander.” During the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767, the chronicles identify him as Nai Thong Suk, a Mon from Ban Pho Sam Ton in Ayutthaya. When the Burmese besieged the capital, Nai Thong Suk joined their side and fought vigorously, leading Nemyo Sithu to appoint him to the rank of Suki. He volunteered to attack and successfully captured the Bang Rachan fortifications. After Ayutthaya fell and the Burmese prepared to withdraw, Suki was appointed commander of the Burmese–Mon forces stationed at Pho Sam Ton, tasked with seizing people and collecting valuables to send after the main army. When King Taksin captured the Burmese camp at Pho Sam Ton, Suki was killed in battle; however, the Sangiti Yawong, composed in the reign of King Rama I, states that he escaped. The Panchanthanumat (Choem) Chronicle records that the commander came to submit to King Taksin, and that later Prince Thepphiphit persuaded him to go to Phimai. Suki secretly fled to join Prince Thepphiphit, but when King Taksin subdued the prince’s faction at Nakhon Ratchasima, the commander was executed on that occasion. (Thonburi Knowledge Compendium, 2000: 171)

5.4 After the fall of Ayutthaya, what local polities emerged, who were their leaders, and where were they established?

After the fall of Ayutthaya, the kingdom was left in disorder and fragmentation. With no reigning monarch, various provincial leaders asserted their own authority, gathering followers and forming their own factions or communities. The major communities numbered six in total, namely:

1. The Burmese community — After gaining victory over Ayutthaya, the Burmese did not govern the city directly, but left forces behind to control the Thai population, dividing them into two groups as follows:

1.1 The group of Suki Phraya Naikong, a Mon who served as a Burmese auxiliary, commanded about 3,000 men and was responsible for seizing property, capturing Thais who fled from the Burmese, and suppressing those who resisted. Their camp was based at Pho Sam Ton, north of Ayutthaya.

1.2 The group of Nai Thong In, a Thai who had joined the Burmese, controlled Thonburi and was tasked with gathering people and collecting valuables to be sent to Burma.

2. The Phitsanulok community of Chao Phraya Phitsanulok (Rueang) — When Ayutthaya fell to the Burmese in 1767, Chao Phraya Phitsanulok had led the Phitsanulok army to help defend the capital. While he marched north to fight the Burmese at Sukhothai, Luang Kosa and Prince Chit seized his wealth and took control of Phitsanulok. When he learned of this, he returned with his forces, retook the city, drowned Prince Chit, and established his base at Phitsanulok until Ayutthaya finally fell. The Phitsanulok community controlled the region from Phichai and Phitsanulok down to Nakhon Sawan. Chao Phraya Phitsanulok commanded a large and capable force, and his military skill made him the main hope of the northern Thai population for restoring the kingdom. His community was regarded as one of the strongest.

The Chao Phraya Fang community — Chao Phraya Fang was the Supreme Patriarch of Sawangkhaburi, or Muang Fang, located in present-day Uttaradit Province. His original name was Ruean, a northerner who had come to Ayutthaya to study the Tripitaka and attained the rank of Maha. He later became Phra Phakun Thera, a royal prelate of the Aranyavasi sect (Thuan Bunyaniyom, 1970: 59), residing at Wat Sri Yothaya, and was subsequently appointed Supreme Patriarch of Sawangkhaburi. He was highly revered by the people, and was known to possess expertise in magic, incantations, and occult practices.

4. The Nakhon Si Thammarat community of Chao Nakhon (Nu) — This group declared independence and established itself as a sovereign power, controlling the Malay Peninsula region up to Chumphon. It was a community with strong manpower and a stable economic base.

Chao Nakhon (Nu) had previously served in Ayutthaya, attaining the rank of Luang Sitthinaiwoen Mahat Lek, before becoming deputy governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat.

When Ayutthaya fell to the Burmese and the throne became vacant, the deputy governor (Nu), who at that time was acting governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat (the former governor, Phraya Ratchasuphavadi, having been removed for misconduct; Thuan Bunyaniyom, 1970: 59), established himself as ruler of Nakhon Si Thammarat. He came to be known among the people simply as Chao Nakhon. All the major towns on the western coast of the southern region acknowledged his authority, making this one of the major communities after the fall of the capital.

5. The community of Krom Muen Thepphiphit, or the Pimai community — This group was led by Krom Muen Thepphiphit (Prince Khaek), who gathered his forces at Pimai. Its territory extended across Nakhon Ratchasima eastward toward the domains of Vientiane and Cambodia, and southward to Saraburi along the Pa Sak River. Krom Muen Thepphiphit was a son of King Borommakot of Ayutthaya, born to a principal royal consort. Although the exact offices he held are not clearly recorded, it is believed that he was a senior prince serving in important palace positions and entrusted with royal duties.

When Prince Krom Khun Phonphinit relinquished the throne to Prince Krom Khun Anurak Montri (King Suriyenthrathibodi or King Ekkathat) and entered the monkhood, Krom Muen Thepphiphit, who had long been attached to Prince Phonphinit (Prince Uthumphon), followed him into ordination at Wat Krachom (located near Wat Nang Kham at the confluence of Khlong Sai and the front moat of Chantharakasem Palace; east of it stood Wat Pradu, where Prince Phonphinit resided). At one point, Krom Muen Thepphiphit and his supporters requested that the monk-king Uthumphon return to the throne. When this became known to King Ekkathat, Krom Muen Thepphiphit was punished.

S. Plai Noi (2003: 150–153) recounts that “after Phraya Aphai Racha, Phraya Phetchaburi, Muen Thipsena, Nai Chui, and Nai Phengchan conspired with Krom Muen Thepphiphit, they fled from Wat Krachom when they feared suspicion, but were captured at Pa Na Roeng outside the city. Phraya Aphai Racha, Phraya Phetchaburi, and Nai Chui were flogged and placed in full shackles—five kinds of restraints consisting of foot irons, stocks, a chained neck, a wooden collar over the chain, and both hands locked in a wooden yoke fixed to a beam. Muen Thipsena and Nai Phengchan escaped.” This account follows the Royal Siamese Chronicles.

The Royal Autograph Chronicle, however, elaborates differently: learning of the matter, Krom Muen Thepphiphit fled from Wat Krachom and took refuge at Wat Pha Nang Choeng (present-day Phanan Choeng). Many officials and retainers loyal to him gathered in great numbers, building a defensive encampment around the temple. Officers sent to arrest him could not seize him because his followers resisted. When the king learned of this, he dispatched a skilled envoy to tell Krom Muen Thepphiphit that the king declared: “You are loyal; this affair was devised by your subordinates. Send them to me, and no punishment will fall upon you.”

Fearing royal punishment, Krom Muen Thepphiphit agreed. The chief officer fled with his family, while the deputy hanged himself. The remaining officer vanished and could not be found. The prince’s retainers dispersed, while Krom Muen Thepphiphit fled westward with several sons. Royal agents captured them at Pa Phrathen Dong Rang and brought them before the king, who ordered the prince defrocked and placed under guard.

Meanwhile, the embassy ship (the Royal Siamese Chronicle records it as an English vessel engaged in trade) that had sailed earlier to Lanka returned after delivering monks. The king ordered a new ship built in the Year of the Tiger, Samritsok (1763), and sent it again to Lanka carrying two royal prelates—Phra Wisutthajan and Phra Vorayanmuni—along with three other monks, and officials responsible for bringing back the monks sent on the previous mission. Krom Muen Thepphiphit was also put aboard this ship and exiled on the island of Lanka.

When Krom Muen Thepphiphit was in Lanka, both officials and commoners there held him in high esteem, believing him to be the royal brother of the King of Ayutthaya. They assumed that he had come to Lanka out of religious devotion to visit the Buddhist stronghold, unaware that he had been exiled. They conspired to overthrow the King of Lanka and to place Krom Muen Thepphiphit on the throne of Singhala. When this was reported to the Lankan king, he ordered the conspirators arrested, and Krom Muen Thepphiphit fled to a foreign land. At that time a rumor spread that Ayutthaya had fallen to the Burmese. Learning of this, he boarded a vessel and went to Mergui in 1762 (Chulasakarat 1124). King Suriyenthrathibodi sent officials to supervise him at Tanintharyi. When the Burmese captured Tanintharyi, he was sent to Chanthaburi. Later, when the Burmese advanced to Ayutthaya, Krom Muen Thepphiphit took refuge in Prachinburi. The Burmese attacked Prachinburi and took it, and Krom Muen Thepphiphit and Phraya Rattanatibet fled to Khok Phraya Pass in Nakhon Ratchasima, where they killed the governor of Nakhon Ratchasima. Luang Phaeng, his younger brother, escaped and persuaded Phra Phimai to retake Nakhon Ratchasima. Luang Phaeng intended to execute Krom Muen Thepphiphit, but Phra Phimai instead brought him to Pimai.

Seeing that he was a prince of Ayutthaya, Phra Phimai elevated him as ruler of Pimai, and Krom Muen Thepphiphit appointed Phra Phimai as Chao Phraya Si Suriyawong. Later Chao Phraya Si Suriyawong killed Luang Phaeng. When King Taksin of Thonburi failed to subdue the Phitsanulok community, he turned to suppress the Pimai community, which was the weakest. He ordered Phraya Mahanarai (Bunma) and Phraya Ratchawarin (Duang) to attack the Kakhot Pass, while the king himself led the main army and captured the Choho Pass in 1768. Chao Phraya Si Suriyawong was captured and executed. The army then advanced to attack Pimai. Phraya Mahanarai and Phraya Ratchawarin captured the Kakhot Pass. Phraya Worawongsathirat (the youngest son of Chao Phraya Si Suriyawong, sometimes said to be Phraya) fled to Siem Reap. Seeing resistance was hopeless, Krom Muen Thepphiphit fled with his followers toward Vientiane, but was captured by Khun Chana of Nakhon Ratchasima and brought before King Taksin. At first the king intended to spare him, but Krom Muen Thepphiphit behaved defiantly and refused to submit, so the king ordered his execution, and appointed Khun Chana as Phraya Kamhaeng Songkhram, governor of Nakhon Ratchasima.

One daughter of Krom Muen Thepphiphit, M.C. Ubon, was taken into the palace and became a consort of King Taksin, but was later executed for committing adultery with a European court attendant.

6. The community of Chao Tak — This was the smallest of all the communities, with only about 500 original followers. Chao Tak established his community out of strong patriotism, determined to restore the independence of the Thai nation. At that time he set himself up at Chanthaburi, controlling the territory from the Cambodian frontier to all the eastern coastal towns along the Gulf of Thailand (see details in Chapter 6).
(http://board.dserver.org/n/natshen/00000133.html, 21/11/2002)

At this time Chao Tak’s base at Chanthaburi appeared the strongest, and its strategic position for fighting the Burmese was superior to that of the other groups. He possessed exceptional leadership qualities, was a capable warrior, and always led his troops personally in battle.

His conduct inspired respect, fear, and loyalty among his subordinates. Because he and his men were in constant combat, his soldiers became highly skilled and disciplined. He was also supported by a circle of close companions who were key figures in warfare, known collectively as the Tiger Soldiers of King Taksin (Foundation for the Conservation of the Old Palace, 2000: 51–55) (see details in Chapter 19).

In summary, King Taksin first subdued the Burmese communities—those of Suki Phraya Naikong and Nai Thong In—immediately after the fall of Ayutthaya, and this was regarded as the declaration of independence from Burma when the camp at Pho Sam Ton was taken.

As for the remaining four communities, King Taksin subdued them after he had been enthroned as king of Thonburi. He spent three years, from 1768 to 1770, reunifying the territories and restoring them as a single kingdom as before (see details in Chapter 10).